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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, the conflict over the question what is the 
role of proper names In ordinary language has centred around two 
proposals: a sense-reference account, where the meaning of a name 
is given by some favoured description of the bearer, or a desig­
natory account, where the bearer Is the meaning of the name*
Th«re Is a nr<adiRnosîtlon towarda the former aeoonnt, largely
apparent
ease In dealing with a supposedly central question: what Is the 
role of ''Pegasus" In the sentence "Pegasus does not exist"#
If we consider some more standard cases of proper names two 
facts are clear: speakers use a name from one occasion to the next 
with one and the same meaning, and what two men may know of a 
particular individual may not be the same thing. These facts not 
only undermine the traditional accounts but they also prohibit a 
uniform account of all names, bearerless or otherwise, in terms 
of the bare Intentions of speakers irrespective of what populates 
the universe#
These failures indicate the need for a different approach to 
the Issue# The search for a direct answer to the question "what is 
the meaning of a name", prescribed by a sense-reference approach, 
should be replaced by seeking the conditions which must be satisfied
by someone who knows the contribution a name makes to determining 
the truth grounds of statements. The role of standard proper names 
can then be explained without appeal to something which ^  the 
meaning; and further an account of why "Pegasus" is still with us 
can be given, which explains our intentions on the matter without 
unduly detracting fran an ontology of middle sized hardware.
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Chapter I 
THE CONFLICT ABOUT SENSE
1. Introduction
More often than not, proper names name objects. So much Is 
clear. But the connection between a proper name and the object It 
names Is unclear. How does a proper name come to be tied to an 
object? Many philosophers have thought that this connection should 
be explained in terms of the sense of a proper name. The Issue of 
whether or not a proper name Is tied to Its bearer throu^ sense 
has become a battle ground fcr the dispute over the role of proper 
names.
It is perhaps surprising that the dispute should have con­
centrated upon this issue, for in an obvious sense it is clear that 
proper names do have sense. Those who will allow talk of sense to 
enter into discourse at all, will at least accept that two sentences 
Which make statements with different truth conditions have different 
senses. The sense of a constituent of a sentence is then at least 
partly given by the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of 
the statement made by the sentence. Proper names, as constituents 
of sentences which make statements, undoubtedly affect the truth
grounds of the statements made. The truth conditions of the state­
ments "Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo" and "Wellington won the 
Battle of Waterloo" are different. It follows that proper names have 
sense. What then could be under dispute when it is asked whether or 
not proper names have sense?
Tie question under dispute is not whether a proper name has a 
significant role to play in a sentence: the dispute concerns the 
question whether or not a proper name performs its function in virtue 
of some descriptive content to which the name is tied, which gives 
(descriptive) sense to the name. To keep this distinction between 
the sense of proper names clear, I will call the sense which proper 
names have in virtue of their role in naming an object, the meaning 
of a proper name. Proper names because they name objects affect 
truth grounds of statements and therefore have meaning. I will call 
the search for some descriptive content of proper names, which will 
explain how the name performs its role, the search for the sense of 
a proper name. New it is possible to ask the question non-trlvially, 
do proper names have sense.^
^ The terms leaning" and "sense" have enjoyed a somewhat indiscrim­
inate use between these notions. The use of "sense" adopted here 
approximates to Frege's use of the term, when he speaks of the 
sense of genuine proper names in "On Sense and Reference". Our 
use of "meaning" approximates to his use of "sense" in the 
Grundgesetze. 1.32. This terminological distinction is justified 
by the need at least to leave open the question of whether Frege's 
two Uses of "sense" are the same, and by the unavailability of 
other terms to do justice to our notion of "sense", (e.g. "connota­
tion", see Chapter H).
How does a name pick out one object rather than another? It 
is clear that the only way one object can be differentiated from 
another is via the properties which it instantiates. Therefore it 
mi#it be thou^t that a proper name picks out one object rather than 
another throu^ a tie with some true descriptions of the object it 
names. These descriptions would then give the sense of the name.
Now there is of course doubt as to which are the crucial descriptions. 
Should we concentrate on essential descriptions, that is descriptions 
which must be true for the object to be that object, or some set of 
descriptions which are commonly accepted as true of that object, or 
descriptions which just happen to spring to my mind when the proper 
name is used, or when I'm face to face with the bearer?
If we can give an answer to the question of which descriptions 
are suitable candidates for the sense of the name, then it is held 
that the field is clear for a move towards solution of two philosoph­
ical problems and at least an economical formulation of ontological 
problems. If a proper name is tied to its bearer through certain
ouncl
descriptions which are true of the object whleh give sense to the 
name, then we can take advantage of Russell's Theory of Definite 
Descriptions to explain without further trouble how to deny exist­
ence of e.g. Aristotle. Further, with the format of meaning given 
by sense and reference behind us, we mi^t find a difference in
8sense between names of the same object to explain true yet Informa­
tive identity statements. Ontologically speaking we are left with 
just those objects over which, for the truth of our assertions, the 
variables of quantification must be allowed to range. Exploiting 
Qiine ' 8 dictum that "to be is to be the value of a variable" we can 
forgo an interest in any possibly irreducible distinction between 
singular and general terms and put an end to metaphysical specula­
tions about the nature of the simple elements which are the ultimate 
referents of these terms.
The opposite view is that a proper name is not related to its 
bearer through the mediation of descriptions which give the proper 
name a sense. A proper name has no sense, it is used to refer to an 
object. To ask the question how a name comes to refer to this object 
rather than another is to ask an unphilosophical if not unanswerable 
question. A proper name means its bearer. Some dispute may arise as 
to just what the relation of meaning between the name and its bearer 
is. Does a name stand proxy for, imitate, or resemble its bearer, or 
does it label the object named? Moreover It may look as if moving away 
from the sense-reference format will make it difficult to explain 
either how it is that *^egasus doesn't exist" is true, or how true iden­
tity statements can be informative. But these difficulties should not 
obscure the attractions of the view that proper names don't have
sense. If statements about the world can be reduced to statements 
about bearers of names, then perhaps determinacy of sense can be 
guaranteed: there won't be two ways of negating the same proposition. 
Truth gaps are eliminated. And if a way can be shewn for treating 
descriptions as names, then in all properly formed sigiifleant state­
ments it will not be possible to introduce any complex descriptions 
which are not satisfied. The way is cleared to re-awaken concern 
with what there primarily is, with the hope of an ontological criter­
ion which is more Interesting than one of bare pr agnatic s. Finally, 
if such an account of names can be given, then it may be thought that 
we have a paradign case on which to base an answer to the question 
how language hooks onto the world. Statements about the world may 
hook onto reality in the way that names hook onto objects.
This account does little more than suggest the ontological 
complexion and interests of the respective contestants in the con­
flict about the sense of proper names. Both views need consideration, 
although I think it can be shown that the first at least is false, 
and that the second needs radical transformation to explain the role 
of names. In this Chapter I will attempt to deal with some forms of 
the sense view. First two prolegomena.
It has often been thought that there are two equivalent ways 
of asking the question*do proper names have sense! One may ask, what
10
are the presuppositions of a referring use of a proper name, or one 
may ask, what do I knew when I understand the use of a proper name. 
This confusion of two different questions dates at least from Mil, 
who says, "A name ...... denotes the subjects, and implies, or
involves, or indicates, or as we shall say henceforth connotes the 
attributes.Whether the attributes which are indirectly signified 
by a name (Mil's connotation) are implied, involved or indicated is 
a matter of some importance. But what is logically implied by the 
use of a proper name which refers to an object is not necessarily 
the same as what that use of the proper name mi^t indicate for me. 
More formally the distinction between the presuppositions of a 
referring use of a proper name and the sense that a proper name has 
may be put as follows: it is possible to answer the sense question 
in the negative without implying at the same time a negative answer 
to the presupposition question. It is possible that a name does 
not have sense in the way of being tied to its bearer throu^ des­
criptive content, nevertheless that the use of that name to refer 
to an object does presuppose certain conditions. Both questions
1 J. 8. Mil, System of Logic. Book I, Chapter 1, section 2.
^ See for instance C. KLrwan, "On the Connotation and sense of 
proper Names". (Mnd, October 1968), where he first attempts to 
answer the question whether proper names have sense in terms of 
whether their use presupposes descriptions of the object named. 
He shows that a name does indeed presuppose descriptions in the 
strongest way that it is possible to phrase this claim. However 
he concludes that it does not follow that a name has a sense.
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are important to an account of proper names, but they require separ­
ate treatment. It Is with the sense question that we are concerned,
here, thou^ a more precise formulation of this question must wait 
upon consideration of the claims which have been made as to what 
should constitute the sense of a proper name.
The second prolegomenon is to dismiss an attack which might be 
thought to undermine the whole enterprise of treating the question 
of whether names have sense as a serious question. As Plato pointed
out in the Cratvlus. naming is an action performed by human agents.
Tie problem before us is not to explain names as the constituents of 
unchangingly true or false propositions which represent the ontologi­
cal building blocks of some elementary states of affairs of a static 
Tractatus world. Names of themselves don't name or refer to objects, 
but speakers use names to refer to objects. Consequently it mi^t 
be argued that there is no point in raising the question how names 
come to refer to objects. Tiis question can only be asked in the 
context of hew a speaker can use a name on a particular occasion to 
refer to seme particular object.^ And on any particular occasion a 
speaker may use the name "Aristotle" to refer to Aristotle, but, as 
in the notorious case of Dr. Spooner, he mi^t use "Aristotle" to
 ^A more recent formulation of this view is given by L. Linsky, 
Referring:. Also in "Reference and Referents" in Philosophy and 
Ordinary Language. Ed. Charles E. Cat on.
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refer to St. Paul. On this view there is no more reason to concen­
trate on the former case than the latter, or to look for a general 
account of the relationship between "Aristotle" and Aristotle. New 
the premise of this attack is of course justified. We cannot consi­
der names eis constantly linked to their bearers independently of any 
speakers. However, this argument is Insufficient grounds for the 
conclusion that nothing can be said of the relation between a name 
and its bearer in standard uses of the name. We need to consider 
the question what is the relationship between a name and what a 
speaker will standardly use that name to refer to. And whatever the 
answer to this question it must offer some explanation of what was 
odd about Dr. Spooner's use of "Aristotle" to refer to St. Paul.
To argue that there is nothing general which can be said about the 
role names play in sentences which make true statements, is to treat 
the exceptional as the normal, when the task is to explain why the 
oddity Is exceptional.
What then is the connection between a proper name, N^ , and the 
object, bp which it names?! The general form of the sense view is 
that something called "sense" mediates between N^ and b .^ Sense, 
some form of description of bj^, is linked to throu^ truth value 
and is linked to N% by being a part of a speaker's associations with
! Ni is any (unspecified) proper name, and b^ is respectively the 
bearer of N%.
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or knowledge of A distinction can be drawn between those versions 
of the sense view which hold that the description which gives the sense 
of the name is drawn from some commonly accepted facts about the 
bearer, and those versions which hold that the chosen description is 
based on the thou^ts or associations which a speaker may have in 
relation to the bearer and the name. I will call the first the object­
ive sense view" and the second "the subjective sense view". The 
following two sections will consider why neither of these versions of 
the sense view can offer a satisfactory account of the role of proper 
names.
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2. The Sub.lectlve Sense View
Two main proponents of the subjective version of the sense 
view are Hobbes and, in his later years, Frege.! For Hobbes a name 
is a mark which acts as a mnemonic device for its inventor who 
associates the sign with the thou^t he has of the object named.
A mark attains the status of a name when it has been publicly 
accepted, "by common consent of those who use the same language",^ 
as a sign of a thought of the object.
A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark which 
may raise in our mind a thou^t like to some thought we had 
before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them 
a si0i of what thou^t the speaker had, or had not before 
his mind.3
It looks then as if Hobbes' view is that names are signs which sig­
nify, through association, a speaker's private thou^t, conception 
or image of a thing. This sign, in becoming publicly accepted, comes
to signify to others the thou^t the speaker has, "... to signify
n 4and make known to others what we remember ourselves ♦
It has become a matter of some dispute whether Hobbes* view was 
that the relation between a name and its bearer is identical with the
5
causal relation he posits between a sigi and a conception or thought.
! G# Frege: "The Thou^t: a Logical Inquiry", Trans: A. & M. Quinton. 
Mind. 1956.
2 T. Hobbes. De Corn ore. I.ii. (Ed. E. W# Molesworth. )
^ Idem.5 Idem.
3 J, W. N, Watkins. Hobbes's System of Ideas.
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First then let us consider the traditionally accepted view of Hobbes' 
theory, namely that the naming relation is the relation of sigi to 
conception: that a name signifies, through mnemonic association, a 
thought.! We will then consider what account of names is open to 
Hobbes if these relations are not the same relation, if the naming 
relation is not a causal relation of sign to conception.
The traditional interpretation of Hobbes' view, that the name 
is a name of something in the mind, i.e. a thou^t, puts Hobbes in 
an untenable position. Here the sense of the name is the thou^t of 
the object which is connected to the name through the mnemonic charac­
ter of the name. Tie sense of the name, the thou^t, and the object 
named are then one and the same thing. New it is clearly not possible 
to treat a name as the name of a thou^t, since it was Napoleon who 
won the battle of Austerlitz, and not my thought of Napoleon. The 
associated thought may be the sense of the name, but it cannot be 
what the name names. Hence on these grounds alone we cannot hold that 
the relation between N% and b]^ is the relation between a sigi and the 
thou^t or sense.
So let us abandon the traditional Interpretation of Hobbes' 
view, and assume that he distinguished the relation of a name to its 
bearer from the relation of a si©i to the thou^t. Hobbes' theory
! This view of Hobbes' Theory is accepted by, for instance. Mil, 
and also Oakeshott in his commentary to Hobbes.
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then is that a name names an object, and the sense of the name is 
the thought of the object, which is linked to the name throu^ 
memory association* The relation between the name and its bearer 
then ceases to be directly causal, though a causal relation remains 
between both the name and its sense, and between the sense and the 
object. On this version the object named arouses a conception or 
thou^t of itself in the speaker's mind, and the thought arouses a 
sound or noise which is the name of the object. Thus the name is 
linked to the object throu^ a thought, which is the sense of the 
name. Now is this second interpretation of Hobbes* view an improve­
ment on the earlier version? Does it leave the causal relation far 
enou^ behind?
New it is clear that if the importation of the notion of sense 
is to serve any purpose, it must at least be able to explain hew the 
name continues to have the same sense from one occasion of its use 
to another. And it is far from clear hew Hobbes* notion of sense 
can account for this. A distinction must be drawn between what it 
is to be the same thou^t, and what it is to be a thoui^t of the same 
object. Now it is true that an object may arouse a thou^t of the 
same thing in many different speakers' minds, but that object does 
not necessarily arouse the very same thought for all speakers. One 
man's images, conceptions, associations with a given object will
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differ from those entertained by another man. For Hobbes the thought 
aroused by the object gives us the sense of the name, so, under the 
condition that the sense of the name is the same for several speakers, 
the sense of the name cannot be given by the thought aroused since 
each speaker entertains different thou(#its. But if the sense of the 
name is given by any thought, so long as it is a thou^t of one and 
the same object, then hew does the thesis that the sense is the 
thou^t offer any explanation of the meaning of the name beyond the 
fact that the name constantly is used to name the particular object 
to which it has been assigned? If the sense of the name is not the 
thought itself, but the common factor of these thou^ts - the object 
of the thoughts - then we cannot explain hew Ni picks out bx in 
virtue of its sense. For here the sense of the name is the bearer.
Thus sense does not explain how a name is tied to its bearer. The 
sense thesis merely reiterates what is to be explained, that a name 
picks out its bearer.
And a similar difficulty arises for the connection between the 
name and the thought. If the thought, or sense, is to play an explana­
tory role in mediating between name and object, and thus aocountèwg for 
the constant relation between a name and its bearer, it is required that 
the sense of the name be constant from one use to another. But the 
link posited by Hobbes between name and thou^t, namely memory
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association, cannot ground an invariant connection such that a name 
may continue to have the same sense.
Psychology has not as yet offered any account of an inviolable 
connection between a word and a thou^t; there must always remain 
some element of contingency in memory such that a thou^t may not 
always remind a speaker of a word, nor a word always remind a speaker 
of a former thou^t. Similarly the name cannot, as Hobbes suggests, 
"be a sign to others of what thought the speaker had", since the 
connection between name and thou^t is neither objective nor public, 
but based upon private memory associations. The utterance of a name 
may or may not arouse the same associations in the minds of an audi­
ence.
Again we mi^t argue that Hobbes does not require that the name 
be linked to the same thou^t, but merely to thoughts of the same 
object. But then for a name to have the same meaning, one occasion 
to another, the sense of the name becomes identical with the common 
object of these diverse thou^ts, namely the bearer of the name.
Here again sense cannot perform its intended role of explaining the 
connection between name and bearer. On this account Hobbes* thesis 
reduces to the assertion that a name is mnemonically linked to its . 
bearer, and perhaps, given a sufficiently loose reading of 'Mnemonic ", 
this assertion is correct, for we do often succeed in remembering
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names of objects. But this thesis has little in common with any 
sense view which purports to explain the connection between name 
and bearer throu^ a third mediating element, the sense.
The failure of memory to provide the strict relation between 
and its sense, or between a particular thou^t and b^ , suggests 
that the second interpretation of Hobbes* notion of the sense of a 
name cannot explain the connection between a name and its bearer.
The "... common consent of those who use the same language ..." to 
accept a mark as a name cannot be given in a way which establishes 
the sense of the name, since social contract cannot dictate the con­
tents of a speaker's memories.
Frege*s position in The Thought raises similar problems. For 
Frege proper names do not name thou^ts, as in the earlier version 
of Hobbes* theory. Statements about Napoleon are about Napoleon.
The sense of the name, for Frege, is given by the thou^ts which 
the speaker associates with the object named. Thus a description of 
b% which gives the sense of N^ mediates between N% and b%. On these 
grounds Frege holds that two speakers may use the same sentence to 
make a statement about b%, but where these two speakerskicw different 
descriptions of bx, they neither express nor even utter the same 
thou^t, althou^ they use the same sentence. In Frege's example 
the sentence "Dr. Gustav Lauben has been wounded" makes a true state-
20
ment, but may express different thoughts when it is used for example 
by Dr. Lauben himself and when it is used by Rudolph Lingens, who is 
not personally acquainted with Dr. Lauben.!
At least two elements in this theory seem rl^t. The truth 
value of the statement, whether asserted by Lauben or by Lingens, is 
the same: both men refer to the same man. It would also seem right 
to suggest that the same sentence may be understood in different ways 
by Lauben and Lingens. The two speakers knew different facts about 
Lauben; each would use different identifying descriptions if asked to 
say whom he meant. But is Prege right in the conclusion that the two 
men express or utter different thou^ts, or, in our terminology, that 
the name is used with different senses by Lauben and Lingens? How is 
it that the two men come to utter different thou^ts when they use 
the same sentence to make the same statonent?
Frege's explanation is that if we suppose that two men each knew 
one fact about Dr. Lauben, which is not the same fact, then "... as 
far as the proper name 'Dr. Gustav Lauben' is concerned, they do not 
speak the same language, since, althou^ they do in fact refer to the 
same man with this name, they do not know that they do so."^ So,
Frege argues, we should make this situation explicit and suppose that 
one of the two, S^ , uses the name 'ir. Lauben* and the other, Sg,
! G. Frege. Ibid (page 297)
2 mi.
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uses * Gustav Lauben*. Thus the two men come to utter different 
thou^ts because in reality they don't speak the same language;
Si and Sg are using two different names. It is possible then for 
Si to take the statement expressed by "Dr. Lauben has been wounded" 
as true, when he takes the statement expressed by "Gustav Lauben 
has been wounded" to be false. The thou#its expressed, since they 
can differ in truth value, are different.
On this account of the sense of a name it is unclear hew any 
communication throu^ proper names is successful. Whenever one 
speaker's knowledge of an individual does not happen to overlap with 
another speaker's knowledge, the sense of the name for the two 
speakers is different: one speaker fails to understand the name used 
by the other speaker. This explanation of the sense of a name, far 
from explaining how a name continues to pick out one and the same 
object, claims that when the name occurs in two sentences, which 
make the same statement, that the name is used with different senses. 
It seems that Frege has attempted to make a virtue of offering no 
answer to the very difficulty he should be trying to solve - the 
problem of how two speakers do mean by the same sentence something 
which ^  the same, even when both knew very different facts about 
the bearer of the name they use. We cannot answer this question with 
the retort that in reality the speakers use different names and both
22
entertain distinct thou^ts.
Furthermore, even on Frege's own account, it cannot be main­
tained that Si, who knows the statement "iXr. Lauben has been wounded" 
to be true, can take the statement "Gustav Lauben has been wounded" 
to be false, since on Frege's account Si does not know the sense of 
the second name, or the thou^t which Sg expresses. Si simply does 
not understand this sentence since by Frege's own admission he speaks 
a different language. To suggest that Si does grasp the thou^t that 
Sg expresses, when he uses the different name, is to make the same 
mistake as Hobbes. It is to suppose that the link between the name 
and its sense is overt. But nothing in the name (sound or inscrip­
tion) can inform the hearer of the thou^t the speaker associates 
with the name. An account of the meaning of a name via the notion 
of sense which stipulates that two speakers, who associate different 
thoughts with the individual named, in fact do not use the same name, 
is no account at all. Language which includes proper names would 
become private language with the additional drawback that you were 
never sure whether a sentence was in your private language or not.
This fundamental difficulty with Frege's theory arises around 
the nebulous status of the thou^t. The thou^t, or the sense a 
sentence may have for a speaker throu^ his associations with the 
bearer of the name, is introduced to embody the clearly distinct
23
cognitive content which two people may associate with a name in a 
sentence, when it is the case that' they know different facts about 
the bearer. But if this is the function of the thou^t, then it 
cannot be what is expressed or uttered in a sentence which uses the 
name. If, on the other hand, the thought is what is expressed by a 
sentence, then that sentence, which is used to make one statement, 
by many speakers, does not express literally the subjective associa­
tions of one speaker or another. The difficulty for Prege is to 
reconcile the subjective content of the thou^t with the objective 
content of the sentence.
Basically the theories of Prege and Hobbes face the same diffi­
culty. In trying to answer the question hew it is that always 
picks out b%, they have attempted an explanation in terms of what a 
speaker understands by the use of the name. But the question must 
always arise, what is the connection between the name and what a 
speaker understands by that name? Both theories offer an explanation 
in terms of the subjective notion of what the speaker associates with 
the object named. But clearly associations must vary between speakers, 
and often for the same speaker on separate occuirènces of the same 
name .Ik Meaning of a name, on this account^  cannot be constant. To 
explain meaning via the sense of a name, where sense is what a speaker 
understands by the name in terms of association, is similar to
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explaining the meaning of the word ’fascist* in terms of a speaker’s 
association perhaps with Germany, or the term ’horse* throu#i its 
association for some speaker with the Derby. The Derby is not part 
of the meaning of ’horse’, although it may in some sense be present 
to or apprehended by the speaker who talks of horses. It might be 
argued, as for instance Wittgenstein! held, that it makes no difference 
to the meaning of the name, if the sense differs between occurences.
But then how much is gained by the introduction of a notion of sense?
If the notion of sense is to have any application towards explaining 
the meaning of N^ , or as constituting part of the meaning of we 
must at least require that the sense of the name is constant. There 
is surely no point in defining something called the sense of proper 
names, which allows that in every occurence the proper name has a 
different sense. How can such a theory explain the relation between 
a name and its bearer which is constant? It explains nothing more 
than that each occiujence of N% is a different occurence of N^ . Such 
a theory of sense cannot even explain the difference between two 
names which refer to the same object. To argue that the sense of a 
name is not constant between one occuarence and another, is either to
! L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigation. (Trans: G. E. M. 
Anscorabe. Oxford 1958) Section 79* Wittgenstein’s difficulty here 
in finding an adequate fixed definition of the name should not be 
invoked as evidence for the view that a name behaves in the way he 
suggests*a game’ behaves. Fluctuations in’definitional sense’ of 
the name do not imply that the name may sometimes pick out one 
individual, other times another.
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say that language is systematically ambiguous, so far as sense is 
concerned, thou^ univocal with respect to reference, or it is to 
say that the inconstancy of sense does not imply systematic ambiguity. 
But if we take the latter, course^  then sense loses its place in an 
account of proper names. For this view admits that the subjective 
associations of the speaker with the object named are irrelevant to 
an. account of the content of a sentence which has a name as a con­
stituent.
This difficulty with the notion of sense of a proper name is 
perhaps tackled in the most radical way by Plato.^ It could be 
argued that one constructive result of the Cratylus, specialised to 
what we should call proper names, is to show the impossibility of 
giving a sufficiently objective account of the sense of proper names. 
Basically, the problem is what is the link between the name and the 
description or sense? So far we have considered subjective accounts 
of this link; that the description linked with the name depends upon 
the associations of the speaker. Cratylus' view of proper names is that 
the link is objectively given by the name itself. A name is a vocal 
imitation of the object named, where the letters and syllables of the 
name show the essential nature of the object. The name then names an 
object, but it is also tied to the object in virtue of being a symbolic
 ^Plato. Cratylus. (Trs H. N. Pew 1er. London, 1926)
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description of the object. The sense of the name, the essential 
characteristics of the object, is thus given objectively and con­
stantly on all occuifbnces of the name. Cratylus* theory can be seen 
as a radical attenpt to explain the connection between and b]_.
If the essential properties of b]_ are given by predicates, 0, Y', 7, 
then will be formed of those letters, or sounds, which represent 
these properties.
Cratylus * theory can be attacked on the grounds that it simply 
moves the same problem one step further back. If we argue that a name 
picks out its bearer throu^ the fact that the letters in the name 
represent properties of the object, then an account must be given of 
the relationship between the letter and the property. Questions like 
%hy should ’Napoleon* stand for Napoleon?'*^  are converted into questions 
like %hy should the letter lambda stand for softness?^ And probably 
the only answer which can be given to tdie latter sort of question is 
that it is by convention that lambda stands for softness. But then 
why not say that ’Napoleon* stands for Napoleon by convention, and 
avoid the problems of determining Napoleon’s essential characteristics?
But a more interesting argument can be raised against Cratylus* 
position. For the theory to succeed the name must become indistinguish­
able from the object it names. The name is an imitation of the object. 
But how can a name literally imitate, threaten to be confusible with.
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a thing it imitates? We must say that the imitation is not such that 
the name becomes exactly like, or indistinguishable from the object. 
But how then do we explain that the imitation is an imitation of the 
object without importing certain conventions which explain how one 
thing can represent another? To change the terminology: the only 
satisfactory account of the link between a name and an object leads 
to the position that there are two objects which are quite the same.
If we allow a difference to creep in between name and object (which 
we clearly must allow), then we must depend upon some sorts of conven­
tion to explain the link. But if we allow conventions to creep in, 
then why reject an account which explains the connection between 
proper name and object in terms of convention from the outset without 
the help of a doctrine of descriptive sense for proper names?
Theories which attempt to explain the link between name and 
bearer throu#i a notion of some subjectively given descriptive import 
of the name in virtue of which that name picks out its bearer seem to 
reduce to one of two equally unsatisfactory positions. Sense is to 
be given either by the associated thou^ts or by the common denomina­
tor of such associated thoughts, namely the bearer of the name. We 
have seen that on either view the introduction of sense is superfluous 
to the explanation of the link between name and bearer. On the first 
view, if sense is given by the associated thou^t of the bearer then
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insofar as these associations are inconstant for different speakers 
they are useless as a basis for explanation of the constant connection 
between name and bearer. This was Frege’s problem. Such associations 
could only qualify as giving the sense of the name if linked object­
ively to the name. But however objective this link, it must be 
grounded on some convention, as Plato shows, and if the link between 
name and its sense rests upon convention, then it is superfluous to 
import sense to explain this relation. And equally on the second 
view (one variety of Hobbes* Theory), if sense is taken to be the 
common denominator of all associated thoughts of the bearer, then the 
notion of sense fails to offer any explanation of what these theorists 
suppose to be necessary, an explanation of the relation between name 
and bearer. For sense no longer mediates between name and object in 
explaining how the name is connected to that object. Sense here 
reduces simply to the bearer of the name, which indicates that, insofar 
as the subjective sense view yields a constant relation between 
and b]^, sense, as the descriptive import of becomes quite super­
fluous. Subjective sense does not appear to add anything towards 
answering the question how a name has meaning, or how a name is linked 
to its bearer.
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5" The Objective Sense View
Given these failings of the subjective sense view we can specify 
some conditions which must be satisfied by any theory which offers 
an explanation of how a name refers to its bearer throu#i its sense. 
The connection between the name and the sense, we have seen, cannot 
rest upon associations of the speaker, nor, as Plato has shown, can 
the connection be found explicitly within the name itself. One 
attempt to solve the difficulty of giving a sufficiently objective 
sense, and to re-instate a sense view is to find a description of b^ 
publicly accessible to any speaker and substitutable for b^'s name 
in all transparent contexts without change of truth value. I shall 
call the sense view that adopts this criterion of sense the * objective 
sense view *.
The general form of the objective sense view may be put like 
this. We use names to talk about objects, but all we can know of an 
object must be expressed in terms of some descriptions of the object. 
If we know what we are talking about in using a proper name, then 
this cognitive content must be given in terms of descriptions of b]_. 
The sense of a proper name is given by this cognitive content. But 
since cognitive content may in general vary from one speaker to 
another, we must now concern ourselves only with that part of the 
cognitive content of a name which does not vary with each occuiy&nce
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of the name. It is a description which satisfies this condition of 
objectivity which will give the sense of the name, and thus explain 
the link between a name and its bearer.
Clearly in order to assess any such objective sense theory we 
need a test for the objectivity of the phrase which is a candidate 
to express the sense of the name and an adequate criterion is given 
by the principle that the phrase should be substitutable for the name 
both salva veritate and salva modalitate. More formally we may say 
that / gives the sense of N]_, if and only if, in all sentence frames 
containing %  which make statements which are true or false, 
can supplant N]_ both salva veritate and salva modalitate. Oi this 
criterion it is clear that the description ’’the one philosopher bom 
in Stagira” for instance cannot give the sense of the name *Aristotle* 
since it cannot be substituted for the name in the sentence ^Aristotle 
is the only philosopher born in 8tagira* preserving the modality of 
the original statement.
Now the plain difficulty for the objective sense view set up in 
this way is to find a description which does give the cognitive con­
tent of the name and yet satisfies the objectivity criterion. It is 
clear that the cognitive content, or sense, must be limited to those 
descriptions of bi which are true. So as a first approximation for 
sense we might take the set of all true descriptions of b]_. But this
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set of descriptions cannot give the sense of and satisfy the 
criterion, for the substitution of this set for the name would make 
all true statements about b% into trivial truths, which they are not. 
An account of the sense of a name must leave room for the fact that 
the question *Was Aristotle bom in Stagira?* is a significant ques­
tion. Thus the set of all true descriptions of bi cannot give us the 
sense of Ni.
Alternatively we mig^t take Frege’s suggestion in *0n Sense 
and Reference*^ and select just one of the true descriptions of bi 
as giving the sense of N]_. But which is the favoured description? 
Frege’s (and Russell’s^ ) suggestion is that the description selected 
should be one of the most commonly known facts about bi. This will 
mean that the sense of a name may vary between occasions of use.
For example, the sense of *Aristotle* for one speaker might be given 
by *Plato’s disciple and the teacher of Alexander*, for another by 
*Stagirite teacher of Alexander the Great*.
But the favoured description theory makes it look as if, at 
least for some people, the statement *Aristotle was born in Stagira* 
is trivially true, whereas in fact the statement asserts a contingent 
truth of Aristotle. Frege attempts to deal with this problem by
 ^G. Frege. *0n Sense and Reference.* Translations from the Philoso­
phical Writings of Gottlob Fre^ e. Ed. P. T# Geach and M. Black 
(Oxford: 1952)
2 B. Russell. Problems of Philosophy. (London: 1912)
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allowing that the sense of "Aristotle* may vary between contexts.
Thus the sense of "Aristotle" may be given by the definite description 
except in the context where JZf is asserted of Aristotle, where the 
sense must be given by another definite description. He argues that 
these fluctuations in sense in the natural language are tolerable.
But the difficulty cannot be avoided in this way. It is clear that 
the sense of a singular term cannot be determined by what is predicated 
of that singular term. We cannot for instance say that the sense of 
"horse" is to be given by "large quadruped with mane and flowing tail 
which neighs" except in the context where we wish to predicate of 
horses a similarity with don keys,when "horse" is then stipulated to 
have the sense "beast ridden by man". If there is any point in talking 
about the sense of a proper name as well as the reference, then the 
sense cannot be allowed to vary according to what is asserted as true 
of the object named.
The fundamental problem with Frege’s theory is the same as that 
encountered by the earlier mentioned theory that the sense of should 
be given by the totality of true descriptions of bi. On both theories 
contingent statements become trivially true. Wbat the objective sense 
theory needs is perhaps some description, (gf, of which it is the case 
that it is true that bi is necessarily gf. This might tempt us to 
search for some essential description of bi, a description such that
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if b;L not gf, then there can be no such thing as the bearer of N]_.
Two possible descriptions might qualify under these conditions for 
the sense of N^ . We might take the description "named or, on the 
lines of Geach’s theory of proper names^ , we might say that a cover­
ing or sortal concept for b]_ might do as the one predicate which b^  ^
necessarily has.
The first proposal falls dcwn on several counts. It cannot be 
argued that the description, "named Ni", can give the sense of the name, 
N]_. Ihis says no more than that the sense of a name is given by the 
fact that it is a name. But what it is to be a name of an object is 
exactly what sense is purporting to explain. Secondly why should the 
senses of "Aristotle" (The Stagirite) and "Aristotle" (the shipowner) 
be the same, when the senses of Napoleon and Buonaparte differ? But 
thirdly, if we say that "named N]^ " is necessarily true of b]^, then 
this does not leave open the possibility of saying that the bearer of 
N]_ might have been called by the name N2. It is only a contingent fact 
that for instance Aristotle was called "Aristotle", and not "Plato" at 
birth.^
Neither is the second attempt at finding an essential descrip­
tion of b^ which will qualify for the sense of N]_ successful. The
 ^P. T. Geach. Reference & Generality. (Ithaca, N.Y.: I962). Mental 
Acts. (London: 1957).
 ^For further discussion of this theory see Chapter III.
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covering concept for an identity statement of the form (N]_ = N]^) 
cannot be said to give the sense of Ni, since it only succeeds in 
differentiating objects of different sorts. Names of different 
objects of the same sort get the same sense. On this theory, althou^ 
the sense of "Aristotle" and "Athens" are different, given respectively 
by "a man" and "a city", the senses of "Aristotle" and "Plato" are the 
same. It may be that Geach is right in suggesting that it is nece­
ssary for the user of a name to know the relevant covering concept,^ 
but it cannot follow from this argument that the objective sense sought 
after by these sense theorists can be given by a description which 
fails to differentiate one bearer of a name from another. It may be 
that to deny that Aristotle is a man, is to deny that Aristotle is 
Aristotle. We cannot then conclude that this essential description of 
Aristotle gives the sense of the name. Nor on the substitution criter­
ion of the objective sense view can the relevant covering concept be 
substituted for the name salva veritate. For the statement "a man 
tau^t Alexander" may be true when the statement "Aristotle tau#it 
Alexander" is false.
The requirements of the objective sense view seem hard to satisfy. 
No definite description which is contingently true of bi will pass the 
substitution criterion, yet no essential description which can differ-
 ^The role played by the sortal in the meaning of a name is further 
considered in Chapter III.
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entiate the bearer of a name from another object is available.
These seemingly insurmountable problems suggest that the search for 
the sense of the name must be conducted on less rigid lines than 
those dictated by any commitment to the view that names are merely 
shorthand descriptions. It is after all a unique convenience of 
names that they enable us to refer to objects without describing 
those objects. Rather than search for the favoured description which 
the name abbreviates, the objective sense view should perhaps be based 
upon a quite different approach to the connection between name and 
true descriptions of the bearer.
A recent exponent of such an approach is Searle^ . He suggests 
that a name has sense in that it is logically connected, "in a loose 
sort of way" with characteristics of the object named, but the name is 
not shorthand for a particular description of the bearer. The question 
of which particular descriptions the name is tied to is left open.
They include all descriptions which users of the name regard as essen­
tial established facts about the bearer. To use the name does not 
indicate which of these descriptions are true; referring uses merely 
presuppose "the existence of an object of whom a sufficient but so
 ^J* R. Sear le. "Proper Names". Mnd 6? (1958). Also Speech Acts, 
(Cambridge: I969). See also P. F<, Strawson. Individuals. (London: 1959)* and "Proper Names" (A symposium with C. Lejewski.)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 1957, 
where Strawson again supports Searle s approach.
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far unspecified number of these statements are true"* "A referring 
use of a name does not ordinarily assert any of these uniquely refer­
ring descriptive statements, or even indicate which exactly are pre­
supposed. The question of what constitutes the criteria for "Aristotle" 
is generally left open," and when the question does arise, "then it is 
we, the users of the name, who decide more or less arbitrarily what 
these criteria shall be".^ It is just because these criteria are 
unspecified that a name is more than a shorthand description. "Names 
function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descrip­
tions".
The real issue here is whether the introduction of a "loose 
logical connection" between name and descriptions can avoid the 
difficulties of earlier sense views. The theory at least appears to 
offer the possibility of a reconciliatim between the advantages of 
the subjective and objective sense views. The connection between N^ 
and its sense is loose in that the sense is not given by any parti­
cular description of bi* Perhaps then we can yield to the attractions 
of the subjective account without falling foul of the substitutability 
test. At the same time the connection between N% and its sense is 
logical: some description is available for substitution for N]_ which 
might offer an explanation of how N]_ picks out bi on all occasions of
 ^J. R. Searle. "Proper Names". Repr. Fhilisophy and Ordinary Language.
(Ed.) C. E. Caton. p.l59-l6o.
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its use. The success of this theory then rests on hew the notion of 
a "loose logical connection" can be filled out. Can this connection 
be sufficiently loose to by-pass difficulties of the substitutivity 
test, and at the same time sufficiently strict to fix upon which peg 
we are hanging our descriptions?
Searle *s "loose logical connection" between N]_ and commonly 
attributed properties of b]^ might be interpreted in one of two ways.
On the first stronger interpretation, the sense of the name is given 
by a set of descriptions of bi: the inclusive disjunction of properties 
of b%. The connection between and its sense is logical in that this 
set is substitutable for the name: the connection is loose in that the 
set is open ended. Thus if  gP be the commonly accepted proper­
ties of bi, then the sense of is given by "the one thing which
V ’  ......   V But this rendering of Searle's view must
encounter difficulty if we are to preserve the transitivity of the 
relation of meaning the same by a name. For if this set is the sense 
of the name, then must a speaker know the whole set of descriptions to 
knew the sense of N]_? Surely not, for it is stipulated that the set 
is open ended. Then how many of the conmonly accepted descriptions 
of b]_ should a speaker knew? Where is the guarantee that one speaker 
will know the same set as another speaker? Yet if two speakers don't 
know the same set of descriptions, how can it be said that the two
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speakers mean the same by the name? If, on this interpretation of 
Searle's view, it is at all clear what does constitute sense, then 
the theory seems prone to fall by the same attack as Frege's subject­
ive sense view, where speakers with different associations with b]_ 
are forced to speak different languages.
A weaker interpretation of the "loose logical connection" would 
be that the sense of %  is not given by the set of descriptions, but 
rather by any one of the set of commonly accepted descriptions of b^ . 
Here the connection between and its sense is loose in that any one 
description in the set will do duty for the sense of N^ , logical in 
the sense that some one description drawn from the set can be sub­
stituted for N-j_. Now it might be argued that on this interpretation 
Searle can preserve the transitivity of the relation of meaning the 
same by a name. Althou^ the sense of N^ might be given by any one 
of the descriptions in the set, the sense of the name does not vary 
from one occasion to another since any of these descriptions, which 
mi^t give the sense, are members of the same set. But this argument 
fails for at least two reasons.
The unity of the inclusive disjunction of properties of b^ , any 
one of which on some occasion may give the sense of N]_, cannot explain 
the invariance in the meaning of N]_. To suggest that the meaning of 
N]^ is the same for all speakers because the sense of the name for
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each speaker is given by some description drawn from the same set, 
is to make a similar mistake to one pointed out by Wittgenstein. It 
is like saying "'something runs through the whole thread - namely the 
continuous overlapping of those fibres.'"^ The element which of 
course does run throu^ the whole thread is, in this case, the object, 
of which all the descriptions in the set are commonly accepted as true. 
But this fact merely serves to underline what is obvious; that it is 
the bearer of the name which is crucial to the meaning of the name.
The function of picking out an object cannot easily be reduced to des­
cribing that object.
But secondly this weaker interpretation of Searle's thesis falls 
down on the count that it is not clear that we even have a "continuous 
overlapping" of the fibres in the thread. The set after all is com­
posed of "commonly accepted" descriptions of b^ . However, what is 
commonly accepted is not necessarily what is true. A commonly accepted 
description of Richard III is that he was the murderer of the Princes 
in the Tower, and this false description cannot overlap in the right 
way with other true descriptions of Richard III. The connection between 
a name and its bearer cannot be explained by one or many false descrip­
tions of the bearer, nor can "commonly accepted" descriptions be an 
adequate criterion to ensure that the candidate for the sense of
 ^L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. (Tr: G. & M. Anscombe, 
Oxford: 1958). Section 67.
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should pass the substitutability test. On this interpretation of 
Searle‘s thesis the inclusive disjunction which gives the sense of 
N]_ is too loosely connected with Ni to explain how the meaning of the 
name can be constant between varying uses, and too loosely connected 
with bi to explain hew the name continues to pick out just that 
object. It does not seem possible to specify adequately this notion 
of a loose logical connection between the name and its sense.
It seems then that Searle's theory does not succeed in reconcil­
ing the objective and subjective sense views. It does not seem possible 
to combine the logical requirement that the sense be substitutable for 
the name with both the objectivity test and the subjectivity of the 
descriptive content of a name for a particular speaker. But without 
satisfaction of the logical requirement of substitutivity what justifi­
cation is there to suppose that sense helps to explain the meaning of 
a name at all? It may well be that Searle is right when he suggests 
that "the uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names 
in our language lies precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer 
publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to 
agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the 
identity of the object". But this "looseness" in the descriptive con­
tent of a name cannot be accurately represented by Searle's theory of 
a logically loose connection between and sense. It is grounds for
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the belief that the descriptive content of N^ , because variable and 
loosely defined, is in fact irrelevant to the meaning of a name.
The difficulty in finding a description which is the sense of 
the name has led to Quine's suggestion that we can always preserve 
the advantages of treating names as disguised definite descriptions 
throu^ the introduction of a pseudo-predicate, which is the 
unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of ’^ eing bi". Thus a proper 
name, for instance "Pegasus", can always be translated into an 
expression of the form (ix)(Px) where can be read as "Pegasises"
or "is-Pegasus".^ "Given any singular term ....  the proper choice
of for translation of the term into (ix)(Px) need in practice 
never detain us."^
fine's theory does not represent a version of the objective 
sense view. To replace "Pegasus* by (ix)(x-Pegasises) is ex hypothesi 
trivial. The predicate "Pegasises" is not designed to offer the sense 
of the name "Pegasus" or to explain how it is that the name picks out 
the object it does. Noris Qaine’s proposed pseudo-predicate to be 
read as either "called ’Pegasus’" or "is identical with Pegasus".
The deficiencies of these two predicates as interpretations of the
1 W. V. Quine. From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass: 1955) 
Methods of Logic (N.Y.: 1959) Word and Object (N.Y.: I960).
^ W. V# Quine. Methods of Logic pp.219.
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predicate F in (ix)(Fx) do not undermine Quine’s suggestion.^ Nor is 
it accurate to attack Quine’s proposal as a theory which eliminates 
the possibility of an irreducible distinction between the role of 
general terms and that of proper names. As Qjuine says, "We can 
encourage a feeling for the reparsing by letting the epithet ’name’ 
accompany ’Socrates’ and its ilk into their new estate, thus saying 
that the category of names is not dissipated but only reconstrued as 
subordinate to that of general terms . . . It is still open to those 
so inclined to offer an account of why the category of names is a 
category distinct from other subordinate categories within the general 
term'denomination.
A rejection of either sense view is compatible with an accept­
ance of Quine’s device for the reparsing of proper names. We may 
accept "it is not the case that there is something which Socratises'" 
as an adequate translation of the negative existential statement 
"Socrates does not exist", but this brings us no nearer to understanding
 ^See for instance Geach. Mental Acts, page 68, where he argues against 
Quine’s theory that a speaker could not have meant "Cerberises" as a 
predicate since such expressions as "here is another Cerberus" or 
"there are several Cerberuses" are not just false statements - they 
are excluded altogether in the language game played with "Cerberus". 
There is nothing impossible in the notion of a predicate exclusively 
true of one object, nor is it more difficult to explain the ambiguity 
of this irreducible predicate "Cerberises" than the ambiguity of the 
proper name "Cerberus" when there are two dogs so-called.
^ W. V. Quine.' Word and Object, page 3j81.
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how the name "Socrates" picks out the object it does. Equally the 
problem of negative existentiels is only removed ore stage further 
back. Instead of having to explain how the name "Pegasus" can have 
meaning when there is no such thing as Pegasus, we now have to explain 
the structure of this irreducible predicate; hew does "Pegasises", 
which Is true exclusively of Pegasus» have meaning when there is no 
such thing as Pegasus? Quine’s proposal for reparsing names is not 
grounds for support of an objective sense view, but grounds for less 
concern at the failure of the sense views.
The meaning of cannot, it seems, be explained by a set of true 
descriptions of b^ which is the sense, and is substitutable for 
In the next chapter then we will attempt to give an account of names 
which does not give an explanation of a name’s function in terms of 
descriptive sense.
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Chapter II 
THE DE8IŒJAT0BY VIEW
1, Names without Connotation
The last chapter shews that the sense view cannot succeed in 
giving an account of hew proper names have meaning. Three basic 
difficulties lie in the way of success. The first difficulty is 
hew to preserve the transitivity of the relation "... means the 
same by ..." given the heterogeneity of properties which different 
speakers will use to make clear which particular they mean. The 
second difficulty is that if we ignore the subjectivity of the way 
each speaker picks out an object, and treat a name as an abbre­
viated description, then insofar as we preserve transitivity of 
identity we sacrifice, on substitution of the description for the 
name, the modality of some contexts. The only description which 
seemed adequate to deal with these two problems was a Quinean pseudo­
predicate, which if successful leaves the naming relation unexplained. 
This third problem suggests that the approach of the sense view is 
fundamentally misconceived. To attempt to base an explanation on the 
Fregean Sense Reference model encourages us along a road which tends 
to assimilate the way^in which names and predicates introduce terms. 
But an explanation of the naming relation should perhaps begin from a
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position which posits a radical difference between predication and 
naming. In the terminology of the Fregean model, we should consider 
whether the meaning of a proper name can be given simply by its 
reference, without any appeal to sense.
Traditionally Mill is held to be the main advocate of such a 
view. However, it is far fran clear what it was that Mill was denying 
of proper names when he put forward the dictum that proper names have 
no connotation: that names are "unmeaning marks". The questions which 
need answering in Mill’s account, are whether he was denying the ri^t 
thin’0 of proper names, when he said they lacked connotation, and what 
positive account of the role of names can be derived from his doctrine, 
The answer to this first question should help us to formulate what is 
wrong with the sense view.
Mill’s theory breaks down into three theses.^ A proper name 
serves to distinguish an object when spoken of. The name is connected 
to the idea we have of the object. The name itself is an unmeaning 
mark, in that it has no connotation and conveys no information about
p
the object designated. One might well wonder hew these views could
1 J. 8. Mill. A System of Logic (London, Longmans: I96I). Book I, 
Chapter H, 5«
^ The term "designated" is adopted rather than "denoted", for the 
term "denotation" only serves to introduce confusion generated by 
the different uses it has been given by for instance Russell,
Quine, c.f. Geach, Reference and Generality, page 56.
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be consistent. They could only be consistent if an adequate account 
of the connection between name and idea can be given which will leave 
the name without sense, but equipped with powers to distinguish one 
object fran another. Mill offers an explanati06 of this connection 
through analogy with the robber’s mark in the Arabian Nights, where 
the robber, in order to distinguish one house from others, puts a 
mark on the house to be robbed. analogy, in naming "we put a mark, 
not indeed on the object itself, but so to speak upon the idea of the 
object. A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in 
our minds with the idea of the object ..."^  This is an unsatisfactory 
explanation. In the case of the robber’s mark, the mark is at best an 
abbreviated description in code. Morgiana’s contribution is to crack 
the code. The analogy is not strict, for as Mill notes, the connec­
tion in one case is spatial, in the case of a name it is not. But 
then what is the connection? If it is the strict invariant connection, 
which it has to be for Mill, where the name is a symbol, or stands 
proxy for the idea, then how does the name come to designate the same 
object, since ideas of objects will vary from one man to another? It 
looks as if the name must be connected not to our ideas of the object, 
but what these ideas have in common, or to a generally accepted idea 
of the object. This move brings us back to the descriptive sense
 ^J. S. Mill. Ibid. Page 22.
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theories. Mill does not seem to have offered us an alternative 
account of how a name picks out its bearer.
Nor can we draw much from the thesis that the role of a name is 
to distinguish an object when it is spoken of. This thesis, for which 
Mill is not the sole advocate^ is patently correct in one sense, that 
a name is used to identify, or pick out, which particular object is 
meant. But a name cannot distinguish one object fran another. In 
fact it has been a subject of some regret to philosophers of language 
that the world is not composed of material objects each with a differ­
ent name.^ Clearly it is possible within the limited spatio-temporal 
context of a game of chess to name one pawn ’alpha' and another ’omega’ 
but this will not help to distinguish these pawns fran their indiscern­
ible brethren the next time the game is set up. Objects are only dis­
tinguishable from others by their properties, and it is a part of 
Mill’s thesis that to give a name to an object is not to mention a 
property.
On the positive side it does not seem that Mill has given us a 
designatory account of how names perform their role. Before attempt­
ing to give such an account, let us at least locate the bone of 
contention between Mill and the sense theorists in answering the more
 ^For instance J. N. Keynes. Formal Lo l^c (London: 1884)
^ For instance Russell in the search for logically proper names;
Wittgenstein in the search for simple names, especially in the
Notebooks.
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Interesting question of what Mill was denying when he said that 
names have no connotation.
It is a mistake to suppose that Mill’s view directly confronts 
the sense view. The notions of sense, in the sense reference theory, 
and of connotation, in Mill’s theory, are quite distinct. As has been 
suggested, the nearest overlap between these two terminologies, at 
least for predicate expressions, seems to lie between Frege’s reference 
and Mill’s connotation. In Mill "white" connotes, or implies the 
attribute, whiteness, which would seem to be closest to the concept 
white, which is for Frege the reference of "white". However, holding 
Mill to his definition of "connotation" and specialising it to proper 
names, is he really denying that proper names have no connotation?
Mill states that proper names are non-connotative in that they 
"... strictly speaking have no signification:" ... "they do not indicate 
or imply any attribute as belonging to the individual named:" ... ■
"that the name once given, names independently of the reason for which 
it mi#it have been given, and that they are not dependent upon the con­
tinuing presence of any attribute in the bearer."^ These statements 
all aim at saying the same thing, namely why the sense view is wrong, 
but each statement seems to fail in its explanation.
 ^J. S. Mill. Ibid.
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Mill offers us no explanation of "signification" which is less 
than "meaning" as we have used the term. It is quite clear that 
proper names, in that they plainly have a function in language, cannot 
be said to lack meaning.^ It may be that "signification" is intended 
to be closer to "informative content", a catch-all phrase which some 
philosophers since have hoped would distill what is correct from Mill’s 
account. For instance Ryle denies that proper names "convey informa­
tion or misinformation".^ He argues:
From the information that Sir Winston Cluurchill was Prime 
Minister, a number of consequences follow, such as that he 
was the leader of the majority party in Parliament. But 
from the fact that yonder dog is Fido, no other truth about 
him follows at all.
But this cannot be correct. No information is conveyed by telling me 
that yonder dog is Fido, because I don’t know who Fido is. Prcm the 
fact that yonder man is Winston Churchill a lot of informational con­
tent is ccsiveyed to us who know of him already. We have to know who 
Winston Churchill was to grasp the content, but equally, in Ryle’s 
argument, we have to knew what it is to be Prime Minister to catch
 ^In the way we have introduced the term "meaning" for proper names, 
the question of a significant distinction between the function of 
proper names and the meaning of proper names does not arise (see 
for instance J. Xenakis "The function and meaning of names",
Theoria 22. 1956). The oddity of the question "what does N^ mean?" 
should not discourage us from accepting what is clear, that names 
have meaning and a function in that they make some contribution 
to truth conditions of statements made by sentences in which they 
occur.
^ G# Ryle. The Theory of Meaning: in British Philosophy in the Mid- 
Century. Ed. C. A. Mace (London: 1951). See Chapter III.2. for a 
fuller discussion of this objection.
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the consequences* We don't know, without further guidance, what it 
is to be Fldo. If we know the meaning of a name, the use of that 
name certainly conveys information. In this sense names have signi­
fication.
To say with Mill that a proper name implies no attributes of 
the bearer also seems false. It is clearly a necessary condition of 
naming an individual, that we should be able to pick that individual 
out and distinguish it from other individuals. This activity pre­
supposes that the individual have some properties. Hence it is at 
least true to say that a proper name presupposes that the bearer has 
the attribute of having some properties, and that a proper name is 
dependent upon the fact that this attribute at least remains true of 
the bearer.^
Finally, we should agree with Mill that the "name once given is 
independent of the reason ... for which it may first have been assigned", 
No one would wish to dispute his classic example of the name "Dartmouth" 
which may continue to name the same place, when the town ceases to be 
at the mouth of the Dart. But there are many proper names where there 
is no apparent reason for the selection of one phoneme rather than 
another as a name. It cannot then be that Mill's thesis that proper
 ^I do not want to suggest that this is the only attribute implied by 
a name. There are several other candidates, e.g. the attribute 
"called N]_". See also chapter III for relation between name and 
nominal essence.
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names lack connotation should be reduced to this thesis: still less 
can this thesis express what is wrong with the sense view. It seems 
that Mill is saying something important and ri^t, but we have yet to 
formulate what it is.
Campbell has recently proposed two tests, which taken together 
purport to formulate the condition that names do not fulfil their role 
in virtue of a sense.^
The two conditions, which are each sufficient and jointly neces­
sary to being a proper name are:
I For any n, if (is an n) or (are n) is a predicable
expression, then (n) is a proper name if and only
if (n is not an n) or (n are not n) is not self­
contradictory.
II For any n, if (is an n) or (are n) is not a predicable 
expression but it makes sense to attach a predicable 
expression to (n), and if (n) is not a quantifying 
expression, and if it is not impossible that a sentence 
of the form (n is should always be used to make the
same statement, then (n) is a proper name.
Campbell's tests divide proper names into two classes, those which 
have descriptive import and can therefore form predicable expressions,
and those which don't. The first test offers a criterion on which to
judge if a predicable expression is a proper name, namely that it should 
not be self-contradictory to deny the descriptive import of a name of 
1 R# Campbell. '^Proper Names^ % Mind. July 1968.
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the bearer of the name. It is not se If-contradictory to deny that 
New College is a new college. The second class of proper names, 
those lacking descriptive Import, are defined by exclusion as expres­
sions which are not predicable expressions, quantifying expressions, 
demonstratives or pronouns.
I think it can be shown that the second condition does not 
provide a sufficient condition for a word to be a proper name, and 
further if condition II were successful, condition I would be 
unnecessary. In the second condition the phrase "and if it is not 
impossible that a sentence of the form (n is a 0) should always be 
used to make the same statement" is added to the condition in order 
to distinguish proper names from demonstratives and pronouns. But it 
fails to distinguish them in the right way. For it is a contingent 
matter whether a statement of the form "he ... Çf ..." or of the form 
"this ... 0 ..." can be used to make more than one statement. The 
matter depends upon how many things there are in tie world which %e" 
and "this" might pick out. If it were the case that there was only 
one possible referent of a pronoun or demonstrative, this would not 
make either word into a proper name. Similarly it is a contingent 
matter whether or not a sentence of the form "n is gf" always makes the 
same statement. It depends upon how many individuals happen to be 
called by the same name. Names which have been assigned to more than
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one Individual are not any the less genuine names than names which 
happen to have been assigned to only one individual so far.
If this second condition had provided a sufficient condition 
for a word to be a name, why should the first condition be needed?
The answer to this question lies in the basic distinction which 
Campbell draws between names which can form predicable expressions 
when conjoined with the verb "to be", and those which can't. This 
distinction may seem attractive in the light of examples such as "New 
College”, and in the li^t of what Mill had to say about Dartmouth. 
However,this distinction between sorts of proper names is fundamen­
tally misconceived, and consequently the first condition adds nothing 
to the second, and fails to formulate either Mill's doctrine or what 
was wrong with the sense theories.
It does not follow that because proper names may sometimes be 
said to have descriptive import, that they can occur as predicate 
expressions of the form "is an n" or "are n". The inclusion of the 
indefinite article in this predicate format is indicative of the error. 
For what is it to be "A Judas", "a Mary", or, in Frege's example, "a 
Vienna"? In these cases, the name has either ceased to be a name, but 
plays the role of attributing a property customarily associated with 
the object once named by that morpheme, (e.g. to be a Judas is to be 
a betrayer), or the expression "an n" is an abbreviation for "an f
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called n" (e.g. a girl called "Mary"). The case of "New College" is 
deceptive since the morphemes which compose the name also happen to 
be predicate expressions in their own rig^ t. It is an important part 
of any designatory thesis that names cannot form predicate expressions 
Campbell's division of proper names into two classes rests then on a 
mistaken notion of the role of names. Even taken apart from this 
difficulty the first condition cannot succeed. No criterion of what 
it is for a name to have descriptive import is offered. If "Judas" 
has descriptive import, then so perhaps do "Robert" and "Pegasus".
If the only criterion for n having descriptive import is that "n is 
not an n" should make sense, then expressions such as "the Alps" are 
denied proper name status: "the Alps are the Alps" makes sense, but 
"the Alps are not the Alps" is self-contradictory. But it is not 
clear why "the Alps" should fail the test when "The Rocky Mountains" 
passes it.  ^ Whatever Campbell's criterion for the descriptive import 
of a name, his condition does not seem to cover Mill's case of "Dart­
mouth", where the name refers independently of the reason for which 
it was first given, nor to cover the descriptions, suggested by the 
sense theories, which purported to give the name its sense.
I assume here that the inclusion of the definite article in the 
name is accidental. I see no explanation of why we say "The Thames" 
and not "The London". See C. Klrwan, On the Connotation and Sense 
of Proper Names. Mind. October 1968, for a similar view.
55
At least a part of the Mill doctrine could be formulated simply
as:
1. 0(b)(b is N*s bearer 0o)
If N]_ is a proper name then there is no description, 0, such that 
necessarily whatever is the bearer of is 0» This condition rules 
out the possibility that the name implies any attributes in the 
bearer.
However, if this approximates to Mill's theory it will not do 
as a formulation of what is generally wrong with the sense theories, 
for, as we have seen, our condition must leave room for some attributes 
of b]_ implied by N^ . What we need is a condition which rules out the 
possibility that there is a definite description of bi in virtue of 
which picks out b^ » This could be taken account of by:
2. (^ 0) n (b)(b is N's bearer 0b)
If is a proper name, then there is no description 0 such that it is 
a necessary and sufficient condition of being the bearer of Ni, that b^ 
should be 0» Clearly some values of 0 may trivialise this condition.
It is for instance a necessary and sufficient condition of being the 
bearer of "Aristotle" that b^ satisfy the description "identical with 
Aristotle", or the description, "the one thing most like Aristotle". 
However, condition 2 purports to specify what is wrong with the sense 
views. Values of 0 must then be restricted to those descriptions of
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b]_ which are possible candidates for the sense of and no descrip­
tion formed with an occurence of N-j_ could purport to offer the sense 
of Ni. That there is no trivialising value of 0 other than a 
description formed via use of the name, is just what the condition 
sets out to formulate. Hence we need only add the rider to this condition, 
that values of 0 be such that they do not include an occurfénce of 
This rider will then ensure that values of 0 are restricted to genuine 
candidates for the sense of N^ . Condition 2 then specifies what we 
have found wrong with the sense theories: namely that a name cannot 
be taken as an abbreviated description. At the same time this condi­
tion leaves open the possibility that certain attributes may be 
implied by the use of the name, and further that some speakers may 
have different associations with N]_ and may use to pick out b]^ on 
the basis of quite different information and interest concerning the 
bearer.
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2. A Pure Destinâtory View
Mill failed to provide a positive account of hew names fulfil 
their role which could qualify as a designatory view. Probably the 
purest form of such a theory is to be found in the early Russell, who 
held the thesis that the meaning of a proper name is the bearer of the 
name.l There is no question that this theory is wrong; as Ryle has 
pointed out,^  the meaning of a name cannot be the bearer since when 
Jemima eats Ahab, Jemima does not eat a meaning. Meanings do not die 
with bearers of names.
It is well known that Russell was forced to take the view that 
if the meaning of a proper name was the bearer of that name, then 
there were no genuine proper names in our everyday language.^ The 
most likely candidates, demonstratives, personal pronouns and names 
used by their bearers, enjoyed a guaranteed reference,^ but failed to 
satisfy the requirement of a constant one to one correlation between 
the name and its bearer. There might then seem to be very little 
justification for considering Russell's view of proper names at all^  
given their irrelevance to notions of everyday language. If Russell's 
theory represents a pure designatory view then we have seen reason
 ^B. Russell. Principles'of Mathematics (London: 1903)
2 G. Ryle. Theory of Meaning.
^ B. Russell. Loprlo and Khcwledge. Ed. R. C. March (London: 1956)
 ^"Reference" here is used non-intentionally.
58
enough to reject this view without further argument. Nevertheless, 
two points are important. Firstly the possibility of a designatory 
approach to explain hew proper names have meaning should not be 
rejected solely in virtue of the unacceptability of Russell's formula- 
tiai of such a theory. There would seem to be something right in the 
designatory approach which must be drawn out. Secondly a designatory 
approach, in spite of its philosophical tradition, does not necessarily 
imply the metaphysical doctrines with which it has been associated.
Whatever formulation should be given of the designatory view, 
the theory basically is opposed to a single analysis of all singular 
referring expressions. Proper names cannot be assimilated into a 
pattern set by other singular referring expressions. Most referring 
expressions have meaning given by a set of linguistic conventions, or 
in virtue of a sense, which is such that the expressions can be used 
on different occasions to refer to different individuals. Proper names 
cannot be analysed in this way, for although the name "Mary" may pick 
out, on different occasions, several different individuals, this is 
not because there is something apart fran their names which all people 
called "Mary" have in common. The statement "a man was watching the 
tennis" is true under the conditions that one of the men present was 
watching the tennis, but the truth conditions of the statement "Mary 
Was watching the tennis" are not given by whether any one of those
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present, called "Mary", was giving the tennis her attention.^ The 
different individuals which can be picked out by a demonstrative, or 
a definite description, have at least more in common than the trivial 
condition that these individuals can be referred to by these expres­
sions. It is this possibility of a basic distinction between sorts of 
referring expressions which the designatory view of proper names takes 
seriously. The possibility provides incentive to find an improved 
formulation of the designatory view which mi^t avoid the problems 
found in Russell's formulation.
Many arguments have been put forward to suggest that not only 
are Russell's proper names not to be found in language, but that they 
could not be a part of language. Searle for instance has argued,^
"it isn't that there just do not happen to be any such expressions: 
there could not be any such expressions, for if the utterance of the 
expressions communicated no descriptive content, then there could be 
no way of establishing a connection between the expression and the 
object". This argument cannot be successful in rejecting either 
Russell's logically proper names, or in rejecting the possibility of
^ See for instance Quine. Word and Object (p.182) on the "purport of 
uniqueness", where he says "one might well recognise uniqueness - 
anyway in the weak sense 'one at most ' - as implicit in the very 
meaning of certain general terms, viz. ones like 'Socrates'." But 
the weak sense of 'one at most' is clearly inadequate. As argued 
above (p.53) "a Mary" does not function like "one horse".
^ J. Searle. Speech Acts.(Cambridge: 19^ 9) P*93«
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a designatory view. As we argued in Chapter I, it is no easier to 
explain a connection between a name and its sense, than it is to 
explain a connection between a name and its bearer. There is no 
reason why the connection between the expression *^horse" and its 
descriptive content "quadruped with mane and tail" should be clearer 
than the connection between the name "Dobbin" and the particular horse 
to which the name has been assigned. General words are no closer to 
hieroglyphs than proper names, and even in the case of hieroglyphs an 
appeal to convention must still be made to explain why a particular 
should be represented in just that way. The selection of the phoneme 
"horse" to mean horse is just as arbitrary a matter as the selection 
of the phoneme "Dobbin" to name Dobbin. The connection is set up by 
fiat which only socio-anthropological or psychological theory might 
sometimes help to explain.
It is also argued, in support of the thesis that sense must be 
prior to reference, for words have meaning independently of what 
there is in the universe. On this view proper names cannot have mean­
ing throu^ designating their bearers, for their bearers may cease to 
exist though the names continue to have meaning.^ It is not clear what 
such an argument amounts to. For a designatory view does not require 
that the bearer of a name be present in space time: the view does not
 ^Idem.
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encounter any special problems when, for example, Aristotle dies.
What other sense can be given to the argument that language is inde­
pendent of what is in the universe? To argue for the standard case 
of names that they have meaning by designating their bearers, rather 
than in virtue of a sense, may sometimes have seemed to open the 
road to timeless particulars as the bearers of names, but it does 
not presuppose any such theory of substance. To suppose that it does 
is to confuse the designatory approach with Russell's formulation of 
it, and the metaphysical use to which he put the theory. Surprisingly 
it seems we can separate both conflicting theories of the role of 
proper names from their traditional philosophical backgrounds. Just 
as the introduction of Quine's device of pseudo-predicates showed that 
a sense view was not a necessary condition for the anployment of 
Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, so it also seens that a 
designatory view of names need not commit us to a theory of ontologi­
cal simples.
It is clear then, if only on the basis of the intuitive appeal 
of a designatory view and the difficulties encountered by any sense 
view, that the possibility of a mode of reference, where sense is not 
prior to reference should be given a fairer run than it is likely to 
receive on Russell's formulation. Some arguments which seemed to 
militate against such a view are ineffective. Nevertheless there are
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some notable pitfalls to be avoided in any reformulation. Altbouf^ 
it may be obvious that the meaning of a name must be given by the 
assignment of that name to some object, it is by no means clear how 
the relation between the name and its bearer should be specified.
To offer names sense and reference may, as suggested, be to over­
specify the meaning of a name, but we have yet to give an adequate 
account. One thing at least is clear - that the meaning of the n^e 
Cannot be the bearer. Secondly any formulation of the designatory 
view must provide some account of our intuitive conviction that 
bearerless proper names have meaning, and which explains how some 
statements of the form (Aristotle exists) at least appear to make 
true statements about the world. It is not enou^, in explanation 
of our intuitions, to simply dismiss bearerless proper names as an 
inferior breed of referring expressions, which are not genuine 
proper names, and which should have no place in our language. V/hat 
must be explained is why they do. But this explanation must wait 
upon an adequate account of hav standard cases of proper names behave.
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3' A Reformulated Desl.gnatory View
The theory to be formulated is that the meaning of a name is 
given not by the descriptive content or sense of a name but throu^ 
the fact that the name designated the object it does. The question 
is what is the meaning of a name if it is not, as Russell suggested, 
the bearer of the name.
It is none too soon to ask the question what sort of a thing 
are we looking for in the search for the meaning of a proper name. 
So far we have presupposed an account of meaning along Fregean- 
Wittgenstein lines, that the meaning of a constituent of a sentence 
is given by the contribution made by the constituent to determining 
the truth conditions of the statement made by the sentence. As 
Frege says^ .
The simple or composite names of which the name of a 
truth-value consists contribute to the expression of 
the thou^t. This contribution of each is its sense. 
If a name is a part of the name of a truth-value, then 
the sense of the former name is a part of the thou^t 
which the latter (name of a truth value) expresses.
Now it might be argued that this cannot constitute an adequate 
account of meaning. To explain the meaning of a word in terms of its 
contribution to determining truth conditions is to ignore much of
^ G. Frege. Grundpiesetze. 1.32. (Frege's use of "sense" here can 
be read as "meaning" as we have used the term. See Chapter I.)
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recent philosophy and with it what Austin has called the illocu- 
tionary force of statements. Furthermore Frege's account is known 
to confront difficulties in the case of propositions lacking a pre­
determined decision procedure.^ However, there is no need at this 
point to consider the. special case of proper names as they might 
occur in such undecidable propositions. Any theory which deals with 
this special set of propositions, or takes into account more than 
the semantics of statements, must imply some such account as the 
Fregean. For our purposes we can treat Frege's account as laying 
down minimum requirements for what it is to explain the meaning of 
a word.
On this basis it is clear that in looking for the meaning of 
proper names we need not be forced into the straight-jacket of find­
ing definitional substitutes, or, should these fail, of opting with 
Russell for perhaps what seemed the only possible alternative; 
objects thei;n5elves, It is equally important to recognise that the 
search for the meaning of proper names is not carried out in the 
void. We are not confronted with linguistic items, names, which 
must be correlated with what there is; rather we are confronted with 
names which are used significantly by people in certain linguistic 
acts. This apparently trivial and obvious point has an Important 
implication.
M. Dummett. "Truth". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
1958-9.
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The meaning of a word is to be thought of in terms of a speaker 
who uses an expression to mean ..x.., where whatever is meant. I.e.
X, does not have a transparent occurfônce. In the statement "S uses 
expression to mean ..x.." the argument place of x is an opaque 
context. We are not necessarily looking for something which is the 
meaning of the name. To explain hew a name has meaning, or how it 
performs its function in language, does not presuppose that we should 
have found something which is what Nj. means. An account of N '^s con­
tribution to the truth conditions of a statement does not necessarily 
require that there is a direct answer to the question \^vhat is the 
meaning of in sentence S?" It may be possible to fill out N^ '^s 
contribution to truth conditions without the help of a statement of 
the form "..sc,., is what means", where x occurs transparently.
This points the way to a reformulation of the designatory view which 
I hope to show avoids the difficulties which confronted Russell.
Let us replace Russell's dictum with another: that to know the 
meaning of a name is to knew which object the name names. This re­
formulation seems to provide the elements of a solution to many of 
the problems which an account of proper names must confront. Firstly 
it is clear that this formulation of Russell's doctrine avoids the 
difficulty of a Fido-Fido reference theory, where the meaning of the 
name becomes intersubstitutable with the object itself. The
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introduction of "knowing" into the dictum creates an opaque context 
which prohibits any equation between meaning and the bearer of the 
name. Jemima does not eat meanings simply because every mouse she 
gets has a proper name. Secondly it is clear that this is not 
simply a trivial evasion of %le's objection. The move which avoids 
Isle's attack leaves open the possibility of giving a designatory 
account of such negative existential statements, as for example 
"Ossian does not exist". For on this formulation of the designatory 
view it is at least not obvious that knowing which object N]_ names 
necessarily commits us to the existence of what is named. It is not 
obvious that a statement cannot be true without it being the case that 
there is such a thing as b]^ . At least the behaviour of non-standard 
cases of bearerless names rœiains an open question. We can safely 
concentrate on the standard cases, without having to foot any onto­
logical bill.
It can be argued that this dictum, unlike Russell's, leaves 
the notion of naming totally unexplained. In its present form the 
dictum needs further explanation. It must be explained in particular 
how the meaning of any particular name can be elucidated and what it 
is to make clear which object is named. There are many ways a speaker 
Can make clear, on any occasion, which object he means. In most cases 
some definite description will be used, by means of which a speaker
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can make his meaning clear. Part of the explanation of this dictum 
must consist in delimiting a set of possible descriptions by means 
of which the meaning of the name can be specified. On this account 
althou^ the meaning may be specified in many different ways, it 
does not follow that when two speakers use the same name they mean 
different things by it. For the meaning is not to be equated with 
the way in which it can be given. Given an adequate delimitation 
of the set of descriptions by means of which the meaning may be 
specified, this designatory view will preserve the transitivity of 
identity of the relation "meaning the same by" without introducing 
the awkward problems which confronted the sense view where meaning 
Was equated with some definite description - the sense - which was 
substitutable for the name.
This chapter has shown two things. Firstly, we have tried to 
see precisely where the sense view goes wrong. Secondly, we have 
seen the possibility of offering an alternative account throu^ a 
designatory approach. This approach represents a move away from the 
Fregean Sense-Reference analysis of all singular referring expres­
sions, but, as we have seen, it does not necessarily commit us to 
the metaphysical conclusions which its main advocate, Russell, may 
have drawn.
Nevertheless, the reformulation of Russell's theory in terms of
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the dictum leaves much to be explained. In particular, there are 
three questions which need to be answered. First we must consider 
the question. What is a name? Or, more transparently, what is it 
to use one and the same name with one and the same meaning? 
Secondly hew is the thesis that the meaning of a name can be given 
by appeal to some descriptions to be spelled out in a way which 
avoids the requirement of intersubstitutability? Thirdly what is 
the relation between the name and what is named? The answer to 
these questions, which we will discuss in the next chapter, should 
indicate how the theory based upon the dictum can explain the 
standard uses of proper names.
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Chapter III 
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NAME mO THE NAMED
1. The Name
If it is the case that to know the meaning of a name, N]_, is o 
to know which object N]_ names, then a proper name which serves on 
different occasions to pick out several different individuals, must 
either be a different name whenever it is used to name a different 
individual, or the name must be ambiguous. Now it is quite in order 
to say that several people share the same name, for instance "John 
Snith", but it is equally clear that when I say "John Smith attended 
the cricket" I refer only to one of the individuals called "John 
Smith", no matter how many John Smiths there were at the cricket, 
or whether you knaw which of these individuals I am referring to.
The purported number of a name in any given use is not necessarily 
the same as the number of individuals to which the name has been 
assigned. It seems then that some account must be given which 
explains hew a name picks out only one individual which leaves 
room for the possibility that several people share the same name. 
What are the identity conditions of a name? Are they to be given 
in terms of the identity of the individual picked out by the name.
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or in terms of an identity of phonemes or inscriptions?
It is clear that any confusions which are generated by the 
difference between the number of individuals a name picks out and 
the number of individuals which share the same name, occur throu#i 
an equivocation over the distinction between token and type. Vflien 
we speak of several individuals sharing the same name, we have in 
mind a name-type, where the identity conditions are given in terms 
of the same noise, or the same mark. On the other hand, when we 
talk of the name "John Snith" picking out an individual, we have 
in mind a particular use of the name-type, a token. However this 
simple type-token classification needs further refinement to provide 
the account we need, for it ignores the fact that we can talk about 
a name type "t " of which this occud&nce is a token. We can list 
possible name-types without using these name-types in referring posi­
tions, namely as tokens. It looks as if a two-fold type-token dis­
tinction is called for. Let us take an example which includes the 
requisite confusions:
John Smith was a friend of Jack Robinson and John Smith,
thou^ John smith was no friend of Jack Robinson.
To make this example clear let us assume that there is no possibility 
of friendship with oneself, and that the statement is not self­
contradictory. New in the sense in ihich we distinguished name-types
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earlier, this example contains two, of which the following, "John 
Smith" and "Jack Robinson" are further tokens. In the example 
there are three tokens of the name-type "John Smith" and two tokens 
of the name-type "jack Robinson". Let us call these tokens name- 
type tokens.
A second type-token distinction can be dravm with respect to 
the individuals designated. In the example the speaker refers to 
three individuals. Let us say the speaker uses three name-instances, 
of which "John Smith" in its first occurrence is a token of one name- 
instance, of which "John Smith" in its second and third occurrences 
are two tokens of a second name-instance, and "Jack Robinson" in its 
two occurrences are two tokens of a third name-instance.
Are names, in the sense in which we have attempted to give the 
meaning of a name, name-types, name-type tokens, name-instances, or 
tokens of name-instances? In this context, what is meant by a name 
cannot be either a name-type or a name-type token, for in neither of 
these senses does a name purport to pick out any individual. We 
mij^t compile a list of the most fashionable Eiglish names. This 
list would consist of tokens of name-types, but neither the tokens 
nor the types have any meaning. The sense in which "name" is used 
in the context of the meaning of a name, is of a name-instance the 
tokens of which occur in sentences, not lists, and do purport to
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designate individuals. Now if we ask the question in what sense do 
two individuals share the same name it is clear that what we are 
talking about is not name-instances, but name-types. It is now 
clear how the purported number of a name can differ from the number
of individuals to which it has been assigned. The purported number
of a name-instance need not necessarily be identical with the 
number of individuals to which the name-type has been assigned.
It is now possible to explain what it is for a name to be the
same name. The identity conditions of a name-type are given by the
phonemic identity of the name-type tokens. "John Smith" is the same 
set of phonemes, words or noises, as "John Smith". This is quite 
distinct from the identity conditions of a name-instance. TWo tokens 
of the name-type "John Smith" may not be tokens of the same name- 
instance. The identity condition for the same name-instance is that 
the name-type tokens should be the same, and should be used to pick 
out, or at least to purport to pick out, one and the same individual. 
This account leaves room for the fact that "Napoleon" and "Buonaparte" 
are both tokens of different name-types and different name-instances. 
They are two different names (name-instances) with (l trust) the same 
meaning.^ The account also allows that two occurences of the name-
 ^This implies that, in Geach’s example, the English "Warsaw" and the 
Polish "Warzawa" are also different name-instances. Althou^ intui­
tively it may be more acceptable to say that one is a translation of 
the same name in Polish, it would be unclear where we are to draw 
the boundary. Intuition tells us that "Napoleon" and "Buonaparte" 
are different names. What does it tell us for "La Manche" and 
"The Channel"?
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type "Pegasus" may be tokens of one name-instance, despite the fact 
that these tokens of the name-type do not pick out one and the same 
individual, but only purport to do so.
This account also provides an answer to the question of whether 
a name is a word. New if a name (name-instance) is a word, then 
several problems arise which are difficult to answer. For instance, 
how many words is the name "Julius Caesar"? It would seem that the 
answer should be two. Yet when I pick out the same individual by the 
name "Caesar", in one sense I use the same name, and yet only one word. 
Furthermore, words are embedded in particular languages, and proper 
names do not seem to be, for I can talk of Ho Chi Ming without knowing 
a word of Vietnamese.^ It would seem that a type-token distinction for 
words would find its parallel in the type-token distinction drawn 
between name-types and name-type tokens. But a name-instance is nei'ttier 
a word-type, nor a word-token. The word "pen" is a token of the word- 
:type "pen". The ambiguity of "pen" does not give us two word-type s.
But the name-type "Cerberus" when multiply assigned to my dog and your 
cat gives two name-instances. On the type-token account given, a 
name (instance or type) is not a word althou^ both function throu^ 
tokens which are words. Some names, such as most names of people, 
function throu^ a token which is composed of two words; the tokens 
of names of places tend to be single words.
^ P. Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, N.Y.: i960), makes the same point.
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There is no way of distinguishing an occurence of a name-type 
token from a token of a name-instance. Both tokens are inscriptionally 
the same. It is the context of the occurence which enables us to dis­
tinguish whether the token is a token of a name-instance or of a name- 
type. The type-token account then provides an answer to the dispute 
as to whether Wittgenstein's dictum, that a name only has meaning in 
the nexus of a proposition, is true.^ On this theory there must be 
some context for the occurence of the token which enables us to decide 
whether the token occurs as a name (name-instance) and has a meaning, 
or whether it occurs as a token of a name-type, where the name has no 
meaning. It follows that the "independent use" of names, advocated by 
Geach, cannot be independent of sane context. Names do require "some 
immediate context of words, uttered or understood".^ Wittgenstein's 
dictum, which stipulates a condition for his own brand of simple names, 
can,it seems .apply to proper names of ordinary language.
It seems then that the type-token account of what it is to be a 
name can provide an answer to the questions posed. It must also be 
able to deal with the objection that such a theory flagrantly dis­
obeys Occam's Law. It could be argued that there is an unnecessary 
duplication of names; if a name is a name-instance, only the all- 
seeing eye of God can detect from the token occurences how many names 
are being used by a speaker. In the example given (p-70) without some
 ^L. Wittgenstein. Tractates (London I96I) 5*3»
2 P. Geach. Reference and Generality (1st Edition; Cornell; I962) p.26.
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further information we cannot tell whether or not the statement is 
self-contradictory. We cannot tell from two indistinguishable tokens 
whether or not two individuals are named. Instead of multiplying 
names, why not say of all tokens of the same name-type that they are 
tokens of one name. Some names are ambiguous, namely those assigned 
to more than one individual, other^ by coincidence, are univocal.
It can, I think, be seen in terms of our example that this 
retort would be misconceived. If we say of all tokens of the name- 
type, that each is a token of a name, which may or may not be ambi­
guous, then in our example we have two names, '^ John Smith" and "Jack 
Robinson", rather than three name-instances. But then a name becomes 
indistinguishable from a name-type. Now no account of what it is to 
be a name can afford to overlook the distinction between names as 
they occur in lists, and names as they are used by speakers in sent­
ences. To accept a distinction between name-d^ ypes and name-instances 
is to do no more than to recognise a use-mention distinction. To 
accept a distinction between name-type tokens and tokens of name- 
instances is simply to adhere to the evident position that neither 
name-types nor name-instances are words. If there is a distinction 
between the types, then there must also be a distinction between the 
tokens, whether or not this distinction can be recognised frcan the 
tokens themselves. This objection then has the appearance of a last
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ditch defence of the so-called lab el-on-the-b ot tle theory of proper 
names which, having lost the bottle, (the object named) would at all 
costs retain the label with its spatio-temporal characteristics.
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2. Specification of the Meaning of a Name
A basis for an explanation of how names have meaning has been 
suggested in the form of the dictum that to know the meaning of a 
name, N]^, is to know which object N^ names. We have said further 
that the meaning of the name can be specified via an appeal to a 
set of descriptions, which are not however substitutable for the 
name. We must now consider this set of descriptions via which the 
meaning of the name may be given. What conditions must be satisfied 
for someone to be said to know the meaning of a name? First, two 
objections, which question the very nature of the enterprise, must 
be dealt with.
The first objection which might be raised against this theory 
is that it is unnecessary for a speaker or hearer to know which 
object is named for him to be said to understand a sentence which 
includes a proper name. The sole informative content which can be 
derived from any sentence 8  ^which states that b-j^ is  ^(where Çf is 
any predicate and b^ is designated by its name N^) is that something, 
called N%, is 0. The sentence itself does not determine which indi­
vidual called Ni is in question. Furthermore, it is clear that I can 
understand sentences, or know what it would be like for the statements 
made by the sentences to be true, without knowing which individuals 
are named. For instance, I understand a newspaper report without
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knowing anything more about the individuals named than what is said, 
(it is doubtful if I even know so much.) To understand the sentence 
"William drove into Oneapolis" I only need to Imow that "William" and 
"Oneapolis" are proper names, I do not have to kna-f which individuals 
are named.
This objection is two-fold. On the one hand it raises the 
point that the dictum offered is intuitively unpleasing, since the 
name itself (the token of the name-instance) cannot tell us at a 
glance which individual is in question. On the other hand the objec­
tion raises the more serious criticism that the truth conditions of , 
the statement made by a sentence predicating 0 of the bearer of N]_ 
are simply to be given in terras of whether something, called N]_, is
izf.
With respect to the first leg of this objection it is indisput­
able that no guidance is to be found in the occuif^ nce of the token as 
to which individual is in question. But then nor do we receive any 
guidance from the words themselves in^  for example, the sentence "The 
chancellor stamped on the bank" which would indicate in which senses 
these words are to be taken. To require that a word should give 
guidance is to revert to the demand for a picture language. To argue 
that all a proper name contributes is "something called is para­
llel to the argument that what the word "blue" contributes to the
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statement made by "x is blue" is merely that x has a property called 
"blue". But one would not want to argue on this basis that the word 
"blue" means no more than "said to be *blue*", althou^ Ji it is true 
that from the words, and from my knowledge of grammar alone, this is 
perhaps the sole informative content of the sentence. The word 
"blue" no more tells me its meaning than does the name "Aristotle".
The intuitive appeal of this objection can be explained by an 
easy confusion of the conditions of use of a proper name with the 
conditions of knowing the meaning of a name. It is clear that a 
speaker can use a name in a sentence to make a true or false statement 
without himself knowing the meaning of the name or the truth conditions 
of the statement. Nor is this distinction by any means peculiar to 
proper names; it is always possible to ask whether something is 0, 
whether or not the questioner knows what it is to be ÇS* The use of 
a morpheme by a speaker does not guarantee that morpheme meaning.
Yet a failure to do justice to this distinction may justify the theory 
that the sole informative content of N^ is rendered by "something 
called N]_". If meaning, or here, informative content, is sou^t as 
the lowest common denominator of all occasions of uses of N]_, then 
it might be thought that "something called N-j^" did give us the meaning 
of N]_. But it is clear that it is not this factor we are after in 
attempting an explanation of the meaning of a name.
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Anything more substantial in this argument should show up in 
discussion of the second leg of the objection that the contribution 
to determining the truth conditions of the statement made by the 
sentence 8^ is given by the explanation ÇS is predicated of something 
called N]_. The obvious counter to this objection is to argue that 
these are the truth conditions only where there is no more than one 
thing called where any token of the name-type is in fact a token 
of only one name-instance. But this underestimates the force of the 
objection. The tokens in the sentence itself do not tell me which 
object is in question; this is indicated by the context of the utter­
ance, not by the name. Where the context fails to indicate clearly 
which name-instance the token is a token of - i.e. which individual 
is in question - then the statement made by the sentence is indeter­
minate. The statement does not have clear truth conditions, whereas 
on the view which follows from the dictum, a case of indeterminacy 
is a case of not knowing the meaning of the proper name.
But this second leg of the objection is no easier to support. 
Firstly, it is clear that the contribution made by to determining 
the truth conditions of the statement made by the sentence 8% cannot 
be given by "something, called Nj_", for this renders the statement 
"Aristotle was called 'Aristotle*" a necessary truth, which it is 
not. Aristotle might as well have been called "Plato"; the sugges-
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tion that Aristotle was so-called may be pointless, but it is not 
self-contradictory.
Secondly, there are difficulties in accepting the thesis that 
where it is not clear from the context of which name-instance the 
token is a token, that the statement is indeterminate. The context 
itself may not include an individuating description such that it 
would render the statement made determinate in all circumstances.
A speaker and his audience may well know of which name-instance the 
token is a token despite the fact that the descriptions of b]_ which 
Can be drawn out of the context do not serve to individuate bi. The 
only justification for accepting the view of the objection that a 
statement under these circumstances is indeterminate would be to insist 
on considering names independently of their use. That a speaker does 
not happen to specify a generally adequate individuating description 
which he knows uniquely identifies b]_, is not proof that he does not 
know which individual he means, nor is it proof that his statement is 
indeterminate.
Finally, this analysis of a proper name has curious implications 
for the truth conditions of existential statements made by any sentence 
Sg of the form "Aristotle does not exist" (where Aristotle is designated 
by Aristotle). Clearly no context can provide an individuating descrip- 
tlon suoh that It renders such statements determinate, which is
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compatible with the truth of the statement made by Sg. Hence this 
statement can never have the value true, except where it so happens 
that only one individual was ever called N]_. But patently this is 
not what is the trouble with these existential statements. The 
problem of giving the logical grammar of the statement "Cerberus 
does not exist" does not lie with the question how many dogs have 
been called "Cerberus".
Let us then return to the central question of hav, given the 
dictum that to know the meaning of a name is to know what object 
names, the meaning may be specified. If the contribution which 
makes to the truth conditions of the statement is that it picks out 
b]_, it is clear that to knaf the meaning of the name we must be able 
to say which individual is picked out by N]_. Now if I am to know 
or to explain which object b^ is, I must be able to give some true 
individuating description of the object designated by the name. For 
any particular bearer of a name there are a wide range of descrip­
tions which might be adequate for this purpose, li/hichever descrip­
tion is selected will depend on what the speaker knows about bl, and 
what that speaker suspects his audience to know or to be least likely 
to misinterpret. No one description is central to making clear the 
meaning of the name, since the description offered is not constitu­
tive of the meaning of the name. However the individual speaker may 
have his own favoured description, which he would normally offer, but
8:)
this fact no longer threatens the transitivity of identity of speakers 
meaning the same by the name. Nor does it threaten modality in rele­
vant contexts. For the description is not the meaning of N^ , but is 
a way of specifying N^ 's contribution to truth conditions. Thus the 
substitution test simply does not apply. The explanation of why a 
speaker selects one description rather than another lies now in the 
subjective realm of a speaker's proclivities, which, as we saw in 
relation to the theories of Hobbes and Frege in The Thought, is the 
only place it can lie.
Now it mi^t be argued that this account of the meaning of a 
proper name raises the familiar problem of identification via des­
criptions.^ If names require the backing of descriptions, and 
descriptions are, as it seems, irreducibly general, we have no 
guarantee that we can know any individuating description such that 
it might not be multiply satisfied. How then can a speaker know the 
meaning of a name if we cannot guarantee any individuating descrip­
tion of the bearer of the name?
It is clear that in response to this objection we must distin­
guish the question whether there is such a problem in non-demonstra­
tive identification from the question whether, given the problem, it 
undermines the account of what it is to know the meaning of a name.
 ^See for instance P* F. Strawson. Individuals (London; 1959)
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Now in answer to this second question it is clear that within any 
given frame of reference, adequate to provide spatio-temporal co­
ordinates, we Can give individuating descriptions. It follows for 
instance from the maxim that no two individuals of the same sort 
can be in one place at the same time,^ that to say of any f that it 
is in at is to give an individuating description of that f. 
Furthermore, our success in individuating indicates that we do have 
such frames of reference. Now the problem of Identification is not 
the problem of how we can individuate within a given frame of refer­
ence, but rather how we can independently specify this frame of 
reference - independently of some other frame of reference. It is 
unnecessary to our purposes to dispute whether or not this is a 
genuine problem, for if it is, it is a problem of how to get started 
with Identification, not how to go on. The account offered of proper 
names suggests hew we can go on to pick out objects without employing 
directly the descriptions by which we individuate their bearers. The 
account neither presupposes a problem of identification, nor any 
particular solution to it.
It seems from the account given that what it is to know the 
meaning of a name must be distinguished from what it is to make clear 
to an audience what is meant by the name. A speaker who knows the
 ^D. Wiggins. "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time". 
Philosophical Review, January I968.
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meaning of a name may make clear to his audience which individual is 
meant by the name in diverse ways. He may it is true draw upon his 
set of true individuating descriptions of b]_. On the other hand he 
may appeal to some description which he knows to be false, but knowing 
that his audience believes this description true of the bearer. Given 
that both the speaker and the hearer both hold a body of beliefs which 
are true individuating descriptions of b%, this method of making clear 
which individual is meant may be in practice successful. Equally, a 
speaker may appeal to a description which does not individuate the 
bearer, but within the limited frames of reference of his audience, 
this description may again be successful. For instance, a class of 
history pupils may knew quite a lot about Caesar which includes indivi­
duating descriptions, however they might regard the salient description 
of this individual to be "an epileptic Roman general." This descrip­
tion may not individuate Caesar, nevertheless it migbt be successful 
in making clear to the class which individual was under discussion.
And again it may be possible to make clear which individual is meant 
via a context-dependent, or story relative description, such as,
"the man whom Jones was talking about". However this description 
does not itself purport to individuate the object meant. It merely 
serves to transfer the burden of specification onto Jones.
What is important about these examples is that they indicate
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the distinction which must be drawn between hearer-identification, 
and speaker-identification. If a speaker is to know the meaning of a 
name, he must knew some individuating descriptions of the bearer. He 
may not however knew the same set as those known by his audience who 
may also know the meaning of the name. But if a speaker wants to 
make clear which individual is meant by the name to an audience, he 
may succeed via any description which serves to latch his set of 
descriptions onto those known by the hearer. To give the meaning of 
a name (to an audience which does not know the meaning) a speaker 
must appeal to a collection of true individuating descriptions. But 
to make clear which individual is meant, so long as both speaker and 
audience are in possession of some set of true individuating descrip­
tions, the description offered, which succeeds in linking the two 
sets of descriptions,may be neither true nor individuating.
It follows from this distinction that it may be possible for 
two speakers to know the meanipg of a name, and yet not to know that 
they know the same thing. Given a sufficient availability of true 
individuating descriptions of the bearer of the name, one set may 
not overlap with another. This possibility is hardly a surprising 
consequence^  given the intentionality of the verb "to knovj", where 
notoriously it does not follw that if A knows that 0a. and a = b, 
that A knows that 0b* But the possibility also indicates that making
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clear to an audience which individual is meant by a name is neither a 
sufficient nor necessary condition of Imowing the meaning of the name. 
VJhat it is to know the meaning of a name is then not the same as the 
ability to identify what is meant to an audience; hearer-identification 
cannot ground speaker-identification.^
If, in order to know the meaning of a name, a speaker must know 
some set of individuating descriptions of the bearer, it folloivs that 
these descriptions must be known by the speaker to be true of one and 
the same object. We have also seen that an individuating description 
of a particular is available within a frame of reference, given the 
maxim that no two things of the same sort can be in one place at one 
time. I shall try to show that it follows from these conditions that 
if a speaker knows the meaning of a name, he must know what sort of 
object the bearer is.
 ^An argument which more than supports this conclusion is given by 
B. Williams in "Mr. Strawson on Individuals", Philosophy 36, I96I.
88
5» The Role of the Sortal
It has been argued by Geach that the meaning of a proper name, 
and all its intelligible content, is given by a concept which pro­
vides a criterion of identity for the bearer of the name.^ Geach's 
argument is tliat in order to use a proper name it must be possible 
to go on applying the name to the same thing. However, since"the 
same" is a fragmentary expression and has no sense unless we specify 
the same what, the concept, in accordance with which we can judge of 
the identity of what is named, must be a part of the meaning of the 
name. Furthermore, since the meaning of the name never includes any­
thing about the individual peculiarities of its bearer, Geach argues 
that "... all the intelligible content that can be got out of the 
statement 'Smith committed seven burglaries, then Smith committed 
murder, then Smith was hanged* is *... a man committed seven bur­
glaries, then the same man committed murder, and was then hanged*".^
The rider to Geach * s thesis, that nothing is lost in cognitive 
content by the substitution of "the f" and "the same f" (where f is 
the concept providing a criterion of identity) for the repeated use 
of a name, should be rejected from the start. A hearer who knows 
which river the Thames is, and which cat Jemima is, will clearly lose
 ^P. Geach. Mental Acts (London: 1957)» Reference and Generality 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: I962).
^ Mental Acts. p*71*
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scmething of the informative content of the statement "Jemima crossed 
the Thames" on substitution of Geach's proposed reading.^ A hearer 
who is unacquainted with either individual mi^t be seen to gain some­
thing of informative content. If he does not know the meaning of the 
names "Jemima" and "The Thames", in the way in which we have suggested 
that names have meaning, then it is unclear hew he mi^t knw from 
the look of the sentence, that a cat and a river are at issue. It 
does not seem that the concept which provides a criterion of identity 
for what is named can exhaust the meaning of the name. The important 
question is what part does this sortal concept play in the specifica­
tion of the meaning of a name. To know the meaning of a name, is it 
necessary to know the relevant sortal concept?
It is clear that different kinds of individuals have different 
identity conditions. For instance the same mountain will stay put in 
space and time, whereas the same man can shift around, at least in 
space. It is therefore necessary to know what kind of a thing an 
individual^is before we can have any idea what it would be like for 
something to be the same thing. A truth-condition of the identity 
statement a « b is given by the spatio-temporal coincidence of a and 
b under some covering concept f. It makes no more sense to talk of 
identity statement "a « b", without this covering concept, than it
^ P. Geach. Reference and Generality, p.45.
90
does to suppose that an ostensive gesture accompanying the demonstra­
tive "this" will pick out some object unless I make clear what sort 
of object is indicated. If we are to know what it is for an object 
to be identical with b, we must know what it is to pick out a and b, 
and to trace them throu£^  space and time to see if they do coincide.
We can only do this if we know what sort of thing a is.
Nov; according to the dictum;to know the meaning of a name is 
to know which individual is named; and which individual is named, we 
have argued, may be specified via appeal to any one of a set of true 
individuating descriptions of one and the same individual, the bearer 
of the name. We can see from the above argument that to Imow what it 
is for several descriptions to be true of one and the same individual, 
we must knm what individual that individual is. To make sense of 
identity questions about the individual we need to knew the relevant 
covering concept. It follows then that to knew the meaning of a name, 
we must have a criterion of identity for what is named.
There are two theses that this view does not commit us to, 
though it has been argued that it should. Firstly we are not com­
mitted on this account to Geach * s own argument for the need for a 
covering concept to make sense of identity questions.1 The need for 
a criterion of identity stands without appeal to the dubious thesis
P, Geach. Reference and Generality.
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that X and y may be the same f, though not the same g. In fact, as 
Wiggins has shovm the proof that for any material object there will 
be a concept under which an object will fall throughout its exist­
ence requires the falsity of Geach * s thesis,^ Secondly Geach*s 
argument, that the sortal concept gives the meaning of the name, has 
sometimes been supported by the theory that to use a proper name we 
need to be able to re-identify the bearer. Nov; this theory would 
give us the conclusion we need, for whatever concept will provide a 
criterion of re-identification will also provide a criterion of 
identification. But the theory presupposes an unnecessarily restricted 
view of proper names. For it may not be a necessary condition of N]_ 
being a name that we should be able to re-identify b^ . Such a condi­
tion mi^t be unwelcome since it would rule out the possibility of 
naming momentary particulars, or individuals which as a matter of fact 
cannot be re-identified.
It has been argued against thé thesis that the relevant sortal 
concept must be a part of the meaning of the name, that althou^ some 
classification of what is named must be known, it does not matter if 
this is the wrong classification. Campbell has for instance recently 
argued that althou£ÿi the words "thing", "object", "existent" etc., 
cannot serve as classifiers, any classification, including mis-
 ^D. Wiggins. Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. (Oxford; 19 7^)
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classification, is adequate for the successful assignment and sub­
sequent application of the name. He argues that I can name an object 
which I see every morning trailing a red ribbon behind it, for the 
phrase "material object trailing a red ribbon behind it" can provide 
the requisite classification. Furthermore if I should discover that 
my classification of the object named is wrong, that the object I 
thou^t to be a man is found not to be a man, then, Campbell says;^  
"... what has happened is that a better scheme of classification 
has been adopted. This new scheme is then read back into the earlier 
usages, and this would only be possible if what is now classified as 
a cassowary is the same X as what was earlier classified as a man, 
where X is to be filled in by seme general classifying term".
Noi«j it is not entirely clear what is a case of misclassification 
for Campbell, or how much misclassification is to count as classifica­
tion. However to suggest that it does not much matter whether I 
classify a man as a cassowary or an orang-utan, so long as I can give 
some classification, is to undermine the theory from the start. For 
as we have seen the rationale for the theory that a sortal concept 
must be a part of the meaning of the name is that questions of iden­
tity about the bearer of the name make no sense without some criterion 
of identity, unless we know what sort of thing the bearer is. To
 ^H. Campbell. "Proper Names” Mind. July I968
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classify a man as a cassowary is not to provide a criterion of 
identity for a man, for the covering concept cassowary does not make 
sense of the question what is it to be the same man. Consequently 
Campbell's suggestion that when a misclassification is discovered we 
can simply adopt the new scheme and read it back into the old is 
incoherent insofar as the object was genuinely misclassified in the 
first place. We cannot read the old scheme into the new for what was 
a cassowary cannot be the same X as what is a man, unless it is the 
case that the concepts cassowary and man are both subsumed under a 
further concept which provides an adequate criterion of identity for 
a man or a cassowary. But if there is such a concept, then there was 
no real misclassification in the first place. I^ Jhere the object X, 
known to be a g at t%, is misclassified as an f, at t, we have no way 
of making sense of the identity question "is X at t the same as X at 
ti?", yet Campbell's suggestion of reading back into the old scheme 
requires that we can make sense of this question. On this view the 
phrase "material object trailing a red ribbon behind it" cannot pro­
vide the requisite criterion of identity for the object I see every 
morning. Boats and men can trail red ribbons, and stop to trail them. 
To make sense of an identity question with respect to either it is not 
enough to know that it is the sort of thing which can trail a red 
ribbon.
Campbell's suggestion of reclassification would seem incoherent.
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and certainly must fail in providing grounds for the thesis that 
misclassification is sane classification. Using the name may be 
compatible with misclassification, for as we have seen a speaker 
may use a name and not know the meaning of the name, but a condition 
of knowing the meaning of the name is that a speaker should knw what 
kind of object the bearer is.
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Chapter IV 
EXISTETJCE MD FICTION
1. An Objection on behalf of Vacuous Names
So far we have two conditions which must be satisfied by one 
who is said to know the meaning of a name. If a speaker knows which 
object N^ names he must be able to make appeal to a set of true 
individuating descriptions of what is named. The unity of this set 
of descriptions is given by the condition that all its members are 
true of one and the same thing, what is named N^ . Hence the second 
condition which one who knows the meaning of N]_ must satisfy is that 
he must know what concept covers identity questions concerning what 
is named. It follows from these two conditions that it is not poss­
ible for one to knew the meaning of a name which lacks a bearer.
There are no true descriptions of Ossian^ , and by the same token, it 
is not true to say that Ossian is a man. The account of names given 
rules out the possibility of a uniform treatment of the standard case 
of proper names, those with bearers, and their lesser counterparts, 
those without.
Now it may well be thou^ that this result, if it is not in
1 Macpherson is responsible for a fraud that there was a poet, called 
Ossian, who wrote a certain epic poem about St. Patrick.
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conflict with some good reasons for thinking that a uniform account 
should be possible, at least presents some discrepancy with our common 
intuitions. Normally we tend to think that the phoneme "Pegasus" is a 
name, which has meaning, and that the sentence "Pegasus doesn't exist", 
though raising some problems of logical grammar, makes a statement 
about the world, which, furthermore, is true. It might then be thought 
to be a serious defect of the account which follows from the dictum 
that it does not allow bearerless proper names meaning.
IlŒi strong then are the reasons which may be adduced in support 
of our intuitive belief that bearerless names should be allowed mean­
ing? Tie argument may be propounded in varying forms. It mi^t be 
argued that there is a difference between saying "Ossian lived in 
Ireland" and "St. George lived in Ireland", which mi^t suggest that 
the two names make some contribution to truth conditions; but how 
should this difference be characterised beyond the obvious feature 
that the two sentences differ inscriptionally? Alternatively it might 
be suggested that if we suppose the possibility that Homer did not 
after all exist, then the statement "Homer wrote the Iliad" is now 
false, but the statement must surely mean the same as when it was 
believed true. Again it is apparent that this argument cannot get 
off the ground since it begs the question in supposing that the state­
ment is now false, whereas all that is allowed is that the statement
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is not true.
Perhaps the strongest form of these arguments may be put as 
follows. Let p be the statement form "A exists", and q be the state­
ment form "it is not the case that A exists". Let r be the statement
form "a has property gf". Now to contend that proper names should not
receive uniform treatment must imply either that the meaning of the 
name in contexts p and r is different, or that the meaning of the
name in contexts p and q is different. If we say that the name means
the same in p and q, but not in r, then we allow that the context of 
the occurence of the name determines the meaning of the name. If on 
the other hand we say that the meaning of the name is different in p 
and q, then we allow that the meaning of the name is not independent 
of the truth value of the statement, which is to contravene what Geach 
calls Buridan's law. Therefore it might seem that any account of 
proper names should offer a uniform treatment of names. But it is 
clear that this argument suffers the same difficulties as earlier less 
formalised versions. We need not be cau^t on the first prong of the 
argument since "exists" cannot be treated as a predicate. One of the 
matters under dispute is just how it should be treated in these con­
texts. Nor need the second prong of the argument be a serious threat^ 
since it merely raises to the fore the need to specify Buridan's law 
in a way which can deal with, or at least exclude, cases where the 
sentence must make a true statement if the statement made is to
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have truth conditions.
Tlie case to be made in support of our intuitive belief that 
bearerless names have meaning may not seem strong. Nevertheless it 
would be unwise to dismiss our intuitions too swiftly. Following 
our intuition either the dictum and the account which follows must 
be wrong, or we must be able to offer at least some plausible account 
of why we should ever have thoufÿit that such names do have meaning.
If there is something wrong with the account given of proper 
names, then the fault must lie in one, or both, of two places. Either 
we must question the view that what it is for a name to have meaning 
is given by the contribution the name makes to determining the truth 
conditions, or we must question the account given of what it is to 
know which object a name names. The former does not seem open to 
attack, for it is difficult to see what approach could be taken towards 
meaning which did not include this factor as a central component. Con­
sequently it would seem that the possibility of a uniform account of *
names which was consistent with our intuitions must lie in a reformula­
tion of the account of what it is to know which object N^ names. Is 
such a reformulation possible?
Now it mi^t be thou^t that an account of knowing which object 
is named, which is neutral with respect to whether there is such an
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object which mi^t be given. To know which object is named mi^t be 
thourht of as the sejne enterprise as knowing which object a speaker 
has in mind when he uses the name. And clearly on this formulation 
of the dictum it is not required that a name have a bearer. A speaker 
may truly be said to have Pegasus in mind, without being committed to 
Pegasus' existence. But can we reformulate the original dictum in 
this way?
It miglit be argued that to make clear which object I have in 
mind, I may offer some description, "the ...^..." where the definite 
article indicates that it is just one individual which I intend to 
refer to. A hearer may or may not be satisfied with the description 
offered. If there is more than one thing which could answer to the 
description, then it must be possible to specify further which indivi­
dual is meant. There is then a wide set of descriptions adequate to 
this purpose. Already we have seen that a false belief may be used 
to make clear which individual the speaker has in mind. Equally it 
seems that a speaker can appeal to a belief which was held, thou^ 
it is now generally recognised as false. For instance to make clear 
which individual I mean when I use the name "Richard III", I mi^it 
appeal to the well known description, now accepted as false of Richard 
III, "the man who murdered the Princes in the Tower". I can make 
clear the meaning of the name ‘"jesus" by appeal to the description
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'"the man who walked on water", whether or not Jesus did walk the 
water. Equally I can make clear which individual I mean by the name 
"Ossian" through the description that he was believed to have written 
an epic poem. No-one has to hold these beliefs for it to be the case 
that I Can make clear which individual I mean. It does have to be 
the case that someone once held the description true of whatever is 
meant by the name. Norj the fact that on this account when a speaker 
has specified the meaning of a name, we do not necessarily find 
ourselves in the position of one who can individuate a particular 
object, should perhaps not concern us. If, as has been suggested, 
the relation of meaning something by a name is intentional, with 
respect to indifference to existence, then it would be surprising 
if we found ourselves able to characterise this relation in a way 
which presupposed existence of what is named.
On this proposal for a speaker to know the meaning of a name, 
he must have at his disposal not a set of true individuating descrip­
tions of the bearer, but a set of beliefs which are or were commonly 
held true of what is named. Now in any particular case if a speaker 
is to make clear which individual he means to an audience, he must 
offer some description which the latter believes true of what is meant 
by the name. This proposal then would attempt to distinguish the set 
of descriptions via which the meaning of a name in any particular
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use can be made clear from a set of true individuating descriptions 
of the bearer, which could correctly individuate a particular object 
in the world. This correct set of descriptions would serve to answer 
the question which individual has the property JZf, where the context 
is roferentially transparent. But in the case of making clear which 
individual is meant by a name, we are concerned with the different 
question to which the answer is of the form means the individual 
which ...”, where the ’object’meant is specified within an opaque 
context.
The proposal as it stands is of course incompatible with the 
second condition identified on the earlier formulation of the dictum, 
namely the condition that if a speaker is to knov; the meaning of a 
name he must know what concept f could cover identity questions con­
cerning what is named. Any view which takes seriously the possibility 
of a uniform account of names cannot of course include this condition, 
since we do not know which is the right covering concept for questions 
of identity concerning Ossian, as it is neither true to say that Ossian 
is a man, nor true that he isn*t. However, on the suggestion made here, 
this second condition of what it is to know the meaning of a name might 
be amended to reads that a speaker must know what would be the relevant 
covering concept if it were the case that what is named exists. The 
concept then which covers identity questions about what is named by
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"Ossian" is the concept which Ossian would necessarily instantiate 
were it the case that Ossian existed. For the argument could be 
put that for there to be beliefs about Ossian these beliefs must be 
about one and the same man, just as beliefs about Aristotle are about 
one and the same man. Paradoxically on this view to know which object 
is meant by a name I do not need to know what b%, the bearer, is, but 
what b]_ would be, if it were.
To what extent could this proposal, sketched above, offer a 
coherent account of what it is to know the meaning of a name? The 
first and most obvious attack which might be levelled at any such 
account, is that it is scarcely better off than the original position 
outlined by Frege in The Thou/dit. If we base Imœjing the meaning of 
a name upon a set of commonly held beliefs, then how can the trans­
itivity of identity of "meaning the same by N^" be preserved? Not 
in one sense the proposal we have sketched is better off than Frege’s 
position, for the belief which a speaker may offer in specification 
of what he means by the name, is not the meaning of the name, but a 
way of making clear what the meaning is. The meaning of the name is 
thus not identical with the beliefs a speaker may have about what is 
named. But it is clear that this retort does not tackle the basic 
objection to this form of proposal. .Ihe real difficulty encountered 
by this view, and it would seem any view which abandons a truth
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condition on those descriptions via which the meaning of a name may 
be specified, is that it is not then possible to answer the question 
which object is meant by the name. It may look on the proposal as 
if such an ansv^ er is possible via appeal to beliefs. As we have seen 
it may be possible to make clear which individual is meant, or latch 
one set of descriptions onto a set known by another speaker by means 
of a false description. But this can only be successful in the case 
where both speaker and hearer have a set of true beliefs, which do 
serve to individuate what is meant. Vfliat I may happen to believe 
true of b]_ cannot be thou^t to individuate b^ in a way sufficient to 
guarantee that the meaning of the name is the same. Beliefs, just 
insofar as they do not require an object of belief to exist, cannot 
individuate particulars. To suggest that individuation is unnecessary 
to knowing what object is named by is thus to question the basic 
premise that the meaning of a name must be given by its contribution 
to the truth conditions of the statement made.. And this premise 
would seem unquestionably correct. \
It might be thou£^t that here the supporter of a uniform account
K
of proper names might press^a move away from the meanings of words, 
towards a position which does not countenance meanings as such, but 
concerns itself with what speakers mean on any occasion of the use of 
a name. It mi^t be argued that there are many words which we use in
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communication, where although there may be correct definitions or 
meanings, we do not know what they are, nor do we need to îoaow.
Cases in question might be such words as "simultaneous", "blue", or 
'good ", where understanding what is meant by these words does not 
seem to presuppose an ability to give the correct definition. Simi­
larly with the case of proper names, it might be argued that the 
requirement of a truth condition on the descriptions via which the 
meaning of the name may be specified, is simply a requirement if we 
think that it must be possible to give the correct meaning of the name. 
This however should not be the object of our search when we seek to 
explain the use of proper names.
But again this move fails, for the opponent of a uniform 
account of proper names is neutral over the question of whether we 
need to posit such entities as meanings. He is merely concerned to 
give an account which explains how the meaning of the name is the 
same for different speakers. The supporter of a uniform account of 
names must find this impossible. For it seems that any account which 
purports to offer a uniform explanation of names must, in rejecting 
the truth condition, entertain naming as indifferent to existence of 
what is named. And if the account is successful it must be able to 
preserve the transitivity of identity of meaning the same by a name.
Yet a condition of preserving transitivity is that we should be able to
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make sense of the notion of intentional identity. It would seem that 
this is no easy problem.^ For it remains a mystery how if believes
that b^  is 0 and 8g believes that bg is y , and they meant to refer to
the same person, how we can make sense of this intention in the case 
where we have no independent individuating description of what it is 
they meant to refer to.
It looks then as if we must accept that a uniform account of 
both ordinary and vacuous names is not possible. But if our intuitions 
concerning "Pegasus" cannot be justified, they can at least perhaps 
be explained within the framework of our account of how the standard 
case of names - those lucky enough to have bearers - behave, and may
be said to have meaning.
 ^TJ Geach. "intentional Identity". Journal of Philosophy, October
1967.
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2. Non-Existence
We have argued that the dictum does not permit a reformulation 
which might coincide with our intuitions in offering a uniform account 
of proper names. Let us then return to the original account offered 
of the dictum with respect to the standard cases of names. On this 
account to know the meaning of a name was to knew which object N^  
named. To know which object N]^ named required the satisfaction of two 
conditions: firstly that a speaker should have at his disposal a set 
of true individuating descriptions of the bearer of the name; secondly 
that he should kno^ j what covering concept makes sense of identity ques­
tions concerning what is named. Given this account the long recognised 
problems of giving an analysis of such statements as "Pegasus does not 
exist" are still with us. What is needed is both some account of the 
logical grammar of such statements, and sane explanation of our intui­
tive dislike for a theory which would reject bearerless names as 
expressions without meaning.
The difficulties which arise for the analysis of such statements 
as "Aristotle never existed" are well known. Any sentence S appar­
ently of subject predicate form, such as "Pegasus does not exist" is 
deceptive, for it seems to say something about what is named "Pegasus", 
yet if what is named "Pegasus" doesn’t exist, if the statement made 
by S is true, what can it be about? lilhat is it that there is not?
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Since Frege it has been widely agree that "existence" should be 
treated as a second order concept. Statements such as "a exists" 
then have the form: for some predicate 0, ^^0 is instantiated".
Althou#! as Russell has sham this analysis seems successful for 
definite descriptions, it is not clear how it can be applied to the 
case of names. For if condition 2 holds: if there is no description 
which can be substituted for a name in all contexts salva modalitate, 
then it would seem that Plato's problem of non-being is still with 
us. If on the other hand our only alternative to a sense view is a 
pure designatory view; that the meaning of is given by the bearer 
of the name, then a negative existential statement cannot be signifi­
cant unless it is false. But there seems to be no doubt that a statement 
such as "Aristotle does not exist" is both significant and contingent.
Several ways out of the dilemma have been proposed, all of 
which seem more or less unsatisfactory. It has been suggested that 
the statement "Aristotle exists" should be analysed as "(Ex)(x » 
Aristotle)",^ but this is unsatisfactory for the only thing which can 
satisfy the condition of being identical with Aristotle is Aristotle 
himself, and Aristotle is necessarily identical with Aristotle. This 
account offers no explanation of the very difficulty with which we 
are concerned; what it is to be Aristotle, if it is the case that
 ^For example in Quine; Word and Object.
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Aristotle does not exist. To avoid the apparent paradox of A's non­
existence, it has been argued that perhaps after all existence should 
be treated as a predicate, that "Aristotle exists" should be taken as 
saying that Aristotle is real, where "real" variously has the force 
of observable, in space time, capable of entering into causal relations 
eto.l But on this view it is not clear where the real could lie or 
what existence would be without reality. This suggestion seems scarcely 
distinct from a proposal to return to what Quine has called Vj^ man's 
slum, where we are to admit into our ontology a range of "entities" of 
unactualised possibilities. But, as Quine has pointed out, this over- 
populated universe introduces entities for which we can have no 
criterion of identity, no purpose, and weak grounds for excluding 
further unactualised impossibilities from our ontology.  ^ The view 
that there must be two senses of "existence", one for Aristotle and 
another for Pegasus, has little to recommend it.
These difficulties have led to the view that we should cease 
our efforts to analyse the statement "A does not exist" as a first 
order statement, but attempt a meta-linguistic analysis where we 
analyse the statement as saying something about the name. Not this 
approach should not be dismissed on the grounds that negative
 ^See A- Prior; "iWo Senses of Existence", Analysis 17, 1957, who 
also suggests that Frege held a view like this.
 ^Quine, "On what there is" in From a Logical Point of View. p.l6. 
Cambridge, Mass.; 1953.
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existentiels say something about the world. Semantic ascent does 
not presuppose that ontological controversy is a matter of words.
Again, as Quine argues, "Translatability of a question into seman­
tical terms is no indication that the question is linguistic".^
HOTever, there is a fundamental difficulty which confronts any meta­
linguistic approach to this problem. A meta-linguistic analysis 
requires that the name be mentioned and not used, but then in our 
proposed analysis we cannot have a token of a name-instance. If the 
constituent of our analysis must be a token of a name type, then we 
are faced with the problem of specifying which particular name-instance 
is in question. It might be thouf^ t that this difficulty cold be 
avoided by the device of talking about the name (type) as it occurs in 
certain contexts. On these lines, the statement "Cerberus does not 
exist" might be analysed as for example "the name 'Cerberus* as it occurs 
in sentences such as 'Cerberus has two heads', 'Cerberus guards the 
gates of hell' etc. has not been assigned to any individual". But to 
ensure that we have not here denied existence of several other dogs 
called "Cerberus", we need to be sure that our list of statement forms 
exhausts all possibilities. But if we could be successful here, then 
the sense view would have succeeded in the first place. A meta­
linguistic approach seems prohibited by the difficulty of specifying 
which object, of those named "Pegasus" is in question in the statement
^ Quine. Idem.
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"Pegasus does not exist", and consequently cannot avoid the problems 
of analysing negative existentiels as first order statements.
The problem seems paradoxical. If we are to give an analysis 
of negative existentiels, as S]_, the name must occur in that analysis, 
since, by Condition 2, there is no description of b^ available for 
substitution for N^ . But the name must occur in a referential posi­
tion, otherwise it becomes impossible to make clear which object, 
called N^ , is in question. But if the name occurs referentially then 
the truth of the analysans presupposes the existence of what is named 
and therefore we can never truly deny existence of what is named.
In part this dilemma suggests its own resolution. V/hat we need 
is an occuîtbnce of the name in referential position where there is no 
existential presupposition. Now, any analysis in which the name occurs 
in an intentional context might satisfy this condition. On these 
grounds the statement made by, for example, "Aristotle does not exist" 
might be analysed as: "any statement of the form (Aristotle 0) is not 
true". So, to deny Ossian*s existence is to say that there are no true 
statements which can be made of the form "Ossian This ana­
lysis as yet provides no explanation of our intuitions which beg a 
meaning for "Ossian", nor of the role which "Ossian" plays in this 
analysis. However, before we consider what additional account is
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required to answer this question we should deal with an objection to 
the proposed analysis.
It may be argued against the proposed reading of the existential 
statement that throu^ ÿi the use made of intentional contexts, we have 
simply deserted vyman's slum in favour of a realm of intentional 
objects, which includes statements some of which are nonsense, as for 
example "Ossian 0s". The proposed analysis appears to force us to 
quantify over these statements. Clearly the identity conditions of 
statements are not coincident with the identity conditions of sentences, 
So it might be argued that instead of an "ontology" of real and unreal 
objects, we now have an "ontology" of statements which have truth con­
ditions, and statements which don't.
This objection can be avoided^it seems^by a resort to Quine's 
formulation of propositional attitudes.^ We do not need to posit 
statements as intentional objects, if we can analyse the proposed 
rendering of the existential claim in terms of some complex predicate 
which is true of some speaker. We might then reformulate the proposed 
analysis of the statement "Aristotle does not exist" as; "it is not 
possible that, if speaker S makes a statement of the form (Aristotle 
0s) that S has made a true statement". (s)f^ <)(f(s)-^ g(s)), where 
'f' and *g' here have the values of complex predicates "makes a
 ^W. Quine. Word and Object.
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statement of the form and "makes a true statement" respectively. 
The proposed analysis of existential assertions turns out neutral 
with respect to the question of whether our ontology should include 
statements.
Given this account of existential assertions, it follows that 
the statement "Ossian 0" is neither true nor false, and furthermore 
that the name "Ossian" does not have meaning, in that it is not poss­
ible to answer the question which individual is meant by the name 
"Ossian". If this theory is right then we must be able to explain 
why we should ever have tended towards the belief that "Ossian" did 
have meaning. Some li^t may be cast on this question by looking 
first at the case of names which occur in fiction, for which a similar 
problem of meaning arises.
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3» Names In Fiction
Any account of proper names ocou’/ttng In fiction must take 
account of certain facts. Firstly it is clear that not all state­
ments in fiction are nonsense.^ Secondly many statements in fiction 
are neither true nor false. For example the truth value of the 
statement "llr. Pickwick visited Rochester" will not be affected by 
the discovery that someone, by that name, enjoying some properties 
of obesity, paternalism, etc., is registered as visiting such a place 
at the relevant time. However, it is also clear that there is a 
difference between saying of, for instance, Hamlet, that he loved his 
mother, and of Oedipus, that he loved his mother. Insofar as this 
difference may not be entirely exhausted by inscriptional differences, 
it mi^t be taken to suggest that these names have meaning. Now Dickens’ 
propositions of the form "Pickwick is 0" are, in what Moore has called 
an obvious sense of "about", about r>îr. Pickwick,^ thou^ it does not 
seem that all our propositions about Mr. Pickwick are necessarily 
propositions about Dickens’ propositions.^ For after all we can
1 See for instance R. Braithwaite in "imaginary Objects", Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume, 1933, where he 
argues that in fiction an.author is trying_to use names as both a 
variable and a constant. Since it is impossible for an expression 
to combine both of these roles, all fictional sentences must remain 
nonsense. (His argument suggests that authors are still wrestling 
with the problem, that we will not get sensible fiction until they 
have overcome it.)
^ G. Moore, "imaginary Objects", ibidem. Moore's "obvious sense of 
about" is an intentional sense which Ryle (see 3) rejects.
3 G. Ryle, "imaginary Objects", ibidem, for instance holds this view.
114
speculate on the characteristics of Mr. Pickwick, without feeling 
constrained to accept all Dickens' comments upon his character. 
Inquiries such as could Mr. Pickwick have taken the first coach to 
Rochester if he did not wake until midday, are certainly in order, 
and seem to have ansifers.
Now the problem is to give a coherent account of these facts.
It seems then that althou/^ there are no truth conditions for the 
statement "Mr. Pickwick 0" since, as we all know, Mr. Pickwick does 
not exist, there are truth conditions for the statement "Mr. Pickwick 
0" where it is explicitly governed by an operator such as "in the 
story by Dickens", or "in fiction". Furthermore althou^ it is clear 
that these statements, which are explicitly governed by such an opera­
tor, are about what Dickens says of Mr. Pickwick, the truth conditions 
of these statements are not given by inscriptional identity. Whether 
the statement "in the book, Mr. Pickwick is obese" is true or false 
will not necessarily be judged on the grounds of whether Dickens 
actually writes, "Mr. Pickwick is obese"; it might be enou^ that he 
describes him as of unusually portly bearing, or even enou^ if we find 
that Mr. Pickwick has trouble getting through some gateway that another 
character has no difficulty with.
It seems then that in statements of the form "Mr. Pickwick 0" 
which are not governed by any operator, the statement has no truth
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conditions and the name "Mr. Pickwick" cannot be said to have mean­
ing. On the other hand, where such a statement is governed by such 
an operator, then it seems the statement has truth conditions, and 
furthermore the occurence of the name "[•^r. Pickwick" within this 
statement plays some part in determining what these truth conditions 
are. Now this apparently odd result may be explained. Dickens, in 
writing Pickwick Papers supposes, or pretends that there is an indi­
vidual called "Mr. Pickwick" who enjoys some specified properties, 
k&thin the bounds of this pretence, we know what it is to be Mr. 
Pickwick as opposed to Sara Weller, But in recognising this pretence, 
we know that the name "Pickwick" was not assigned to any object, that 
there is no such individual as Pickwick, and therefore that the name 
does not have meaning. Thus, only granted certain suppositions, and 
granted that we know these suppositions to be pretence, do we know 
the meaning of these names which occur in fiction. Thus we may 
suppose that we know the meaning of these names, despite the fact 
that in making such a supposition we know that we do not know the 
meaning - that these names have no bearers.
This explanation may appear mere sophistry, for it mi^t be 
asked hew can we suppose we know the meaning of these names; either 
we do or we don't. The answer to this question is that we don't. 
There is however a causal story which accounts for why we might have
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thought we did; an account which distinguishes fictional names from 
such nonsense expressions as "Jabberwocky" or "tove”. To know this 
causal story involves knowing that for instance "Piclwick” does not 
pick out an object. It also must involve knowing enough of Dickens’ 
story to know the truth conditions of the statement "Dickens says
Pickwick is obese". For, as we have argued above, the truth con­
ditions of this statement are not given inscriptionally, by the 
occurence of this very sentence in Pickwick Papers. Rather the truth 
grounds of this statement lie in whether the man whom Dickens preten­
ded existed, who in the story is described by the following predicates,
 0x\» was also supposed, in the story, to be obese. Within the
bounds of Dickens’ story, "Pickt^ ick" makes a contribution to truth 
conditions, for^ so confined^  the occurence of the name implicitly falls 
for us under an operator such as "in fiction", "in the story". When 
we discuss Dickens’ character the effect of this operator is to make 
explicit that we are only supposing the name to have meaning, that we 
know it does not. In the case where no such operator is understood, 
our assertion presupposes that there is such an individual as Pickwick. 
But to make any statement with this presupposition concerning Pickwick 
is not to know the meaning of the name, it is to believe that the 
pretence is no pretence at all; that Dickens is describing the world.
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If this account is coherent it must be able to deal with several 
obvious objections which should be raised. Firstly an objection might 
be made on the basis of our earlier discussion of an attempt at a uni­
form account of names. There it was argued, with some support from 
Geach, that a uniform account of names along the lines of the dictum 
was impossible since we could not make sense of the notion of inten­
tional identity. For a name to continue to name the same individual 
it seemed that the bearer of the name must exist. But does not our 
account of fictional names presuppose the coherence of just this notion? 
Does our account not commit us to the possibility of Dickens talking 
about the same individual, Pickwick, when we can give no answer to the 
question what is it to be the same individual as Pickwick?
This objection misplaces the difficulty with the notion of inten­
tional identity. No problem ofintentional identity arises for Dickens 
in writing his story. Dickens can pretend that there is an individual, 
called "Pickwick", and that this same individual has the property 0. 
Furthermore, all descriptions of Pickwick can be retailed under the 
operator "Dickens supposes there is an X, such that .... and that the 
same X is ....". The difficulty of being forced to quantify into 
intentional contexts only occurs when we move outside the context of 
a fictional operator. Vfe only move outside these contexts when we 
misunderstand Dickens' activity.
118
Nor does this view commit us to an ontology of characters some 
of whom are fictional, others not. If we say that Mr. Pickwick is a 
fictional character, what this means is that there are certain works 
where a character called Mr. Pickwick is supposed to exist. That 
Dickens makes up his story, talks about Pickwick, etc., does not 
commit us to a set of unreal objects. Dickens' book is a part of our 
ontology, what Dickens talks about in the book is not.
But it might be thought that if we can avoid an ontology of fic­
tional objects, we can only do so at the cost of admitting a curious 
range of meanings of names. For the explanation given seems to intro­
duce expressions which have meaning, expressions which are nonsense, 
and a third class of expressions which have supposed meanings. Havever, 
this argument can only succeed at the cost of positing entities such 
as meanings. All that the explanation requires is that there can be 
expressions which are supposed to have meaning which is no more grounds 
for the claim that there are supposed meanings, than the view that sane 
expressions have meaning is grounds for the claim that there are such 
entities as meanings.
Neither does this view commit us to the position of denying 
that "r'ïr. Pickwick" is a name, or finding exceptions to condition 2. 
Condition 2 stated that there was no description 0 such that it is a
119
necessary and sufficient condition of being the bearer of the name, 
that b^  ^is 0. Now it might be thou^t that if we allow that "Mr. 
Pickwick" is a name, then this name is tied to certain descriptions 
given by Dickens. Although it seemed impossible to find any descrip­
tion which could be substituted salva veritate and salva modalitate 
for a standard proper name, in the case of "I'lr. Pickwick" it might be 
argued that any of Dickens' descriptions of Pickwick would be inter- 
substitutable with the name. This argument however is to misinterpret 
Dickens' activity. We cannot in all contexts substitute a particular 
description for the name in the book, since Dickens' suppositions are 
not tautologies. We can no more substitute the description "author of 
The Physics" for the name "Aristotle" in "Aristotle wrote The Physics", 
than we can substitute the description "employer of Sam Weller" into 
Dickens' statement "Pickwick employed Sara Weller". It is part of a 
work of fiction that its pretence is based on analogy with the world. 
Dickens treats Mr. Pickwick as if he were an individual who existed, 
for this is part of the pretence, hence there is no description which 
Pickwick is supposed to instantiate which Dickens, throu^ his other 
characters, cannot put in question.
Now the difference between "Ossian" and "Pickwick" is clear. 
Macpherson pretended that "Ossian" named some individual, just as 
Dickens pretends that "Mr. Pickwick" names someone. But in the case
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of "Ossian" we have, at least in the past, been taken in by the pre­
tence, whereas we probably were not taken in by Dickens' pretence. 
Insofar as we were taken in by I^ lacpherson 's fraud, we are under the 
Illusion that we know the meaning of "Ossian". In fact we don't.
When we become aware of how this name did get into discourse, when 
we recognise the pretence for what it is, we then know that we do not 
know the meaning of the name, but further, why we thou^t we did. We 
are now in a position to explain why, in the case of "Ossian", our 
intuition tells us that the name has meaning. The statement "Macpherson 
pretended that Ossian wrote the epic" is true, and is, in an intentional 
sense of ^ about^ , about Ossian. But the only sense in which we can be 
said to kna-j the meaning of "Ossian" is in explicitly recognising how 
it was wrongly supposed that anyone knew who Ossian was. That language 
allows us a way of sensibly reporting nonsense must not encourage us 
to believe that after all nonsense has sense.
The conspiratorial aspect of this account is not of course by 
any means a necessary ingredient. We do not for instance need to 
suppose the first worshipper of Apollo to have been a skillful writer 
of fiction, still less a deliberate deceiver of mankind. Names may 
be introduced into language throu^ supposition, pretence or straight­
forward error.
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This explanation of our intuitions conforms well with the odd 
feature of existential denials. It has often seemed curious that we 
should ever make such statements as "Homer did not exist", for it is 
unclear what might count as evidence for such a claim. Given that 
Homer did exist, it is purely contingent that we knoc; so little about 
him. We might then feel unhappy with the conclusion that should we 
find other authors of the Iliad and the Odyssey, we would on that 
ground deny Homer's existence. Surely we waid then have as little 
reason to claim his existence as to deny it, for we have nothing to 
say about him, since we would not know who he was. l\hy then should 
we make any existential claim at all? It would seem that the answer 
to this question is that we might want to make just such a claim as 
'^Horner did not exist" when we have reason to believe that saneone 
pretended that he did.
In conclusion then we may suggest that the difficulty of names 
such as "Ossian" is that we supposed, sometimes as a result of a pre­
tence, that we knew the meaning of the name. In fact we don't. The 
purpose of existential assertions such as "Aristotle did not exist" is 
to draw attention to the pretence. This may explain the role that 
such a name plays in existential assertions, and these assertions may 
be analysed as the assertion that no true statement can be made about 
Aristotle.
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Chapter V 
INCORRECTNESS IN NAMES
1. The Naming Relation
So far we have considered what it is for a phoneme to be a 
name, and what it is for a name to have meaning. We must now con­
sider the third question, what is the relation between a name and 
what it names. It has often been suggested that naming is intentional 
in that it appears to satisfy one or other of criteria which have 
been proposed for intentional verbs. It has been argued that one way
CL
in which this relation is intentional is that it is^success notion.
It is therefore important to consider the question of how incorrect­
ness in naming can occur: whether incorrectness in names is coincident
with the cases of naming failures.
Now the most obvious sense in which it might be argued that 
naming is an intentional relation is that naming is indifferent to 
existence of a bearer. It is however important to see in what sense
this claim may be justified. Campbell^ has for instance argued that
"a coherent account can be given of proper names which leaves open 
the question whether what is so named exists". This account is given
^ R. Campbell. "Proper Names", r-hnd. July I968
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by a condition proposed by Gardiner^ which states that.
A proper name is a word or group of words which is recognised 
as having identification as its specific purpose, and which 
achieves, or tends to achieve, that purpose by means of its 
distinctive sound alone, without regard to any meaning 
possessed by that sound from the start, or acquired by it 
throufÿi association with the object or objects thereby iden­
tified.
Campbell's two conditions, discussed in Chapter II, are designed to 
make this condition specific.
Now it is clear from the account we have given of the meaning 
of a name that it is not possible to give any coherent account of a 
name, which has identification as its specific purpose, without 
appealing to some set of true individuating descriptions of the bearer. 
The knowledge of such a set does presuppose the existence of the 
bearer of the name. Hence in one sense our account cannot vindicate 
Campbell's claim. However althou^ it is not possible to explain or 
know the meaning of a name in a way which leaves open the question of 
the existence of the bearer, it does seem compatible with our account 
that a phoneme may be a name, despite the fact that that name has no 
meaning. Consequently in another sense Campbell's thesis may be justi­
fied. It is possible for a word to be a name, irrespective of whether 
what it names exists. Insofar as the criterion for intentionality given
 ^A. Gardiner. The Theory/ of Proper Names. (Oxford: 1954)
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by indifference to existence is concerned, naming is an intentional 
verb, in that a word may be a name if it behaves as a name, despite 
the fact that we cannot give a coherent account of the meaning of that 
name unless its bearer exists. This is merely to say that there are 
bearerless names. There is clearly no contradiction in the statement 
"Macpherson named Ossian as the author of the epic". "... names —  
therefore creates an opaque context in its second argument place, for 
it can be satisfied without there being any such thing as .... Naming 
is then intentional with respect to one common criterion.
But it has also been argued that naming is intentional in that 
it is a success notion, and further that any case of a naming failure 
is a Case of incorrectness in naming. I think it can be shown that 
naming is not intentional in this sense, and that althou^ there is 
room for incorrectness in naming on our account, a case of incorrect­
ness in naming is not a case of a naming failure.^
It has been argued that naming is an intentional action in that 
a speaker tries, throuj^ ' his use of the narae^ to do something in which
 ^The argument here tacitly implies a rejection of the thesis proposed 
for instance by J. 0. Urmson in "Criteria of Intentionality" (in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume. I968) 
Relations which satisfy Chishold s first criterion of intentionality, 
indifference to existence, do not necessarily all share the same 
feature of being success notions, or translatable into teleological 
statements. See for example L# J# Cohen's contribution to the same 
symposium.
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he may or may not succeed. Kenny has for instance proposed such an 
intentional account of naming. He defines a name as ‘"any simple 
symbol which is used with the intention of referring exclusively to 
a particular individual of a certain kind Now on this account
"referring" is defined via meaning, that "to refer to something is to 
be successful in meaning it". "Meaning", in its turn, is defined via 
referring, "if A intends by the word ’N' to refer exclusively to B, 
then A means B by 'N*. Only if B exists will A succeed in referring 
to B". 1
There is an obvious circularity in this account which defines 
the two crucial notions of "meaning" and "referring" in terms of each 
other. As it turns out this leads to difficulties for Kenny. On his 
account the notions of intending to refer and succeeding in referring 
come to the same thing, which, it is clear, is unwelcome. For he says 
"if A intends by the word 'N* to refer exclusively to B, then A means 
B by ’n '". But to be successful in meaning something, that is for A 
to mean B by ’n ’, is to refer to something. Consequently the notions 
of intending to refer, and of referring, coincide. Kenny can avoid 
this coincidence by saying that when A uses the word 'n ' to refer 
exclusively, he intends to mean, but does not necessarily succeed in 
meaning, B. But this leaves him in the unfortunate position of denying
 ^A. Kenny. "Oratio Obliqua", Proceedinn:s of the Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 19^ 5.
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meaning to bearorless proper names, since speakers don*t succeed in 
referring to particular individuals, when they use these vaeiuous 
names, if referring is non-intentional as Kenny holds.
But fhis objection is unfair to Kenny-for it ignores the purport 
of his theory. His intention is plain. In defining names in terms 
of referring, which he holds explicitly to be a success notion, he is 
attempting to introduce the possibility of names having a meaning 
which is dependent on their use to refer, whether or not they are 
successful in referring. The name then has meaning through purporting 
to refer. Some names do successfully refer, others fail. But of 
those which fail we have to explain what it is that they have failed 
to refer to which cannot be done unless "refer" is understood as an 
intentional notion. Yet if it is so understood, then there is no 
room for the notion of succeeding in referring. It looks then as if 
an account cannot be given of naming as a success action in terms of 
a speaker's intention to refer, for such an account requires a non- 
intentional reading of "referring" to explain naming as an intentional 
act, and an intentional explanation of "referring" to explain how the 
name has meaning.
If naming is to be explained as an intentional action, where a 
speaker, via the name, tries and may fall to do something, then in our 
account we will have to include the possibility of naming-failures.
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where the speaker's intention is not fulfilled. Now it is important 
to see in what sense there can be cases of naming-failures. Campbell 
has suggested an account which gives rise to the possibility of naming 
failures,^ as occurring where a word, intended to be taken as a token 
of a name by the speaker is not understood as such by the hearer. 
Campbell begins with the question how a word ever comes to be taken 
as a token for a name. He rejects the traditional view that a name 
comes to be a name throu^ the establishment of some convention; a 
word does not become a name when it has been used enough times for it 
to be said that a convention has been established. For Campbell, what 
makes a word into a name is the interpersonal factor in naming. When 
on the first occasion I use the word "Tommy" in tlie utterance "Tommy, 
pass me that hammer", the question of whether or not I have used a 
name does not rest upon whether I have succeeded in establishing a 
convention or habit, still less on whether "Tommy" is the name of the 
individual addressed, but whether this individual recognises ray 
intention to use the word as a name, or recognises my intention that 
the hearer take this word to be a proper name, l^ ihen this intention is 
not recognised we have a case of naming-failure. On the other hand 
when my intention is recognised by the hearer, and he is able to use 
the word himself in the same way, then we have, on Campbell's account, 
a full-blov'm case of a proper name in use.
^ R. Campbell. "Proper Names”. Mind I968.
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It is quite clear that in one perhaps trivial sense this account 
is right. Kojning, or using a name, is an intentional action in the 
sense that the speaker has a purpose in using the neme. Speakers do 
not usually engage in linguistic activity without seme purpose in 
mind. In this sense every linguistic utterance is intentional. But 
this sense of^intentional^is distinct from the claim that Campbell is 
here making for the intentionality of naming. On Campbell's account 
using a name becomes a success notion. Aspeaker has not used a name 
unless it is the case that a hearer recognises his intention that the 
hearer should take the word as a name. Novj it seems to me that this 
view is fi’aught with difficulties. How many in an audience must 
recognise the speaker's intention for the word to be a fully blown use 
of a name? Can vje not have a first occasion use of a proper name when 
the speaker is thinking to himself, or does he need to talk out loud, 
to himself, to get the word qualified as a name; if so, the criterion 
becomes no criterion at all, for this hearer should not have much 
difficulty in recognising the speaker's intention. It would seem 
clear that there are cases in which a speaker may use a name, when the 
audience does not know the meaning of the name used, but it would seem 
absurd to conclude that on such an occasion a name has not been used, 
or that he has failed to name anything. For the speaker to have the 
intention that the word should be a nane requires already that the 
speaker knot? the meaning of the name. Consequently it seems that on
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any formulation of this view we are going to have to say that the word 
is both a name, in that the speaker forms his intention, and not a 
name, since the speaker's intention is not recognised by the hearer. 
Again, on Campbell's version of naming, it does not look as if there 
are such things as naming-failures since their importation rests upon 
a theory of naming which makes naming a success word and naming does 
not seem to be intentional in this respect.
But it may well be asked what incorrectness can occur in names.
For any successful account of names must leave room for the possibility 
of seme incorrectness in names. Now on the theory of the dictum of 
Chapter II it would seem that a speaker can take any phoneme and assign 
it to any existent or non-existent, about which he holds certain beliefs, 
and that this is sufficient to constitute a fully fledged case of a name. 
Is there then no way in which a speaker who uses a name can go wrong, 
either in qualifying a phoneme as a name, or in using that phoneme as 
a name? The first of these questions, namely what it takes to qualify 
a word as a name, raises no interesting questions. Given that a set 
of conditions are satisfied by the speaker which permits the phoneme 
to be used as a name, then there is no further step to take to get 
that word qualified as a name. For example in the case of the name 
"Tommy" it is hot necessary to appeal to a theory of conventions in 
language, or the creation of habits, to explain how "Tommy" can come
1^ 0
to name the person it does. "Tommy" is Tommy's name whether or not 
there is an audience which understands this name. Moore's difficulties 
with the question of how his wife may have succeeded in bestowing the 
non-habitual name "Bill" upon him only arise if Moore was unable to 
ask his wife whom she meant by "Bill".^ The interesting question 
here is what are the conditions which must be satisfied by the speaker 
and the potential bearer if he is to use a word as a name. It is this 
question with which the dictum attempts to deal, and which will be 
discussed further in the next chapter.
Given that recognition by an audience of a speaker's intentions 
cannot be said to explain incorrectness in naming, let us see if a 
place for incorrectness cannot occur in the actual use of a name.
Here it is clear that there is the possibility of incorrectness. A 
speaker may simply use the wrong name, by mistake. In the celebrated 
example of Dr. Spooner, who in his sermon used the name "Aristotle" 
vhen he meant to refer to St. Paul, quite clearly made a mistake. But 
it is not necessary to opt for an account of names which makes naming 
a success notion in order to explain this mistake. The mistake occurs 
because Dr. Spooner has used a name which is not the name conventionally 
assigned to that individual, and this mistake is corrected by his 
comment after his sermon that whenever he used the word "Aristotle" he 
meant to say "St. Paul". This mistake is like such other linguistic
^ G. Moore. Commonplace Book. Ed. Cas^imir Lewy. London I962.
131
errors, as for instance where one says that something is red, 
whereas in fact one means it is green. The speaker has simply made 
a slip. Dr. Spooner could of course have said after the sermon that 
he used the name "Aristotle" to mean St. Paul, and although this might 
be odd, and certainly confusing, it would not be wrong. Consequently 
on the theory of the dictum there is no difficulty in explaining how 
it is possible for incorrectness in naming to occur. To use the wrong 
name has a strai^tfoi’ward sense for a speaker who understands what is 
meant by two names, and by mistake uses one name instead of the other. 
Where there already exists a convention, where a given name is conven­
tionally accepted as having a given meaning, it lessens confusion to 
use that name. However this does not imply that to use a different 
word to mean the same thing is incorrect, but simply that the new name 
must be Introduced, or its meaning explained. "Aristotle" is not the 
right name of Aristotle and "Hob” the wrong name. It is open to me 
to use any name I like, though it is simplest, where there is a conven­
tion, to use the conventionally agreed name.
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/loi account ho,s boon proposed of tho role of names which 
suggests a way of dealing with some of the traditional problems com- 
monly associated with proper names. Tliis explanation cannot purport 
to offer a general account of names, for as yet no defining conditions, 
which might delineate a class of expressions which are names, have been 
established. The question arises; How fundamental arc the conditions 
which have been observed from the behaviour of some standard names?
How fundamental are they foi’ a definitive account of what it is to be 
a proper name?
Clearly one approach towards an answer to this question is to 
consider how far the conditions we have observed can differentiate 
proper names from other singular terms. VIhat guide do these conditions 
offer in deciding whether for instance "wisdom" is the proper name of 
the virtue, or "horse" the proper name of the species. Why.after all 
is "three" not the proper name of the number three? And are the 
expressions which so concerned Russell, ' egocentric terms, proper names 
at all? Even if we have no answer to these questions, we might expect 
that the differences in the ways these terms designate should have 
some bearing on the centrality of the conditions which seem to describe 
the role of proper names.
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One condition observed which does seem to take us sane way 
towards differentiating names from other designating expressions is 
condition 2; this condition requires that there is no description 
of b^, the bearer of a name, N]_, such that it is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of being N^'s bearer that b^ satisfy that des­
cription. This condition picks up what appears to be a crucial 
condition of the behaviour of names, that they refer without describing, 
and it certainly differentiates names from both definite and indefinite 
descriptions. Neither the description "a man who climbed Everest" nor 
the description "the first man to climb Everest" can satisfy this con­
dition. It would also seem that this condition must militate against 
the view that numbers are names of objects, for it is always possible 
to substitute in transparent contexts a description for a number 
expression, salva veritate and (provided we heed scope^) salva 
modalitate. For instance, for the expression "three" we can substi­
tute the description "the immediate successor of two"; the question "is 
three the immediate successor of two?" has the required triviality, 
which we could not find in the case of names and descriptions of their 
bearers.2
^ Cp. Smullyan. "Modality and Description", 1948. Journal of Symbolic 
Loftlc.
2 See generally P. Bemacerref (Philosophical Review ^ 1965), who argues 
that in giving necessary and sufficient properties of numbers we are 
merely characterising an abstract structure, where the elements have 
no properties other than those relating them to other elements in 
the same structure.
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It might also be thought that condition 2 is effective in 
differentiating names from personal pronouns and from such egocen­
tric terms as "now" and "here". With these some definite descrip­
tions, such as "the place where I am", and "at this time" (which 
give the sense of "here" and'how") do seem to be available for sub­
stitution. But these grounds for differentiation already raise 
doubt about hor; central condition 2 is for the status of being truly 
a name. Does condition 2 really give the basic reason why a name 
differs from egocentric terms? This doubt appears to be reinforced 
in the case of personal pronouns. Even if condition 2 can distinguish 
names from the first person pronoun it is less obviously successful in 
the case of third person pronouns. Hovj are vie to refute someone who 
insists that "he" is a proper name multiply assigned.^ There are at 
least two further cases of singular terms where condition 2 is quite 
ineffective as a principle of differentiation; namely the case of 
demonstratives and the case of names of species or of universals.
This failure of condition 2 leads to two questions. First, is 
our confidence in the distinctions of grammar sufficient to incline 
us to find a principle of differentiation in these cases? Vftiy should
1 This difficulty should not mislead us into taking the view that names 
cannot be distinguished from pronouns. It is clear that they can.
For determinacy of reference a pronoun requires the support of an 
antecedent referring expression, or some ostensive gesture. This at 
least gives us cause to question Quine's view that "Pronouns are the 
basic media of reference; nouns might have been better named 
propronouns". (From a Logical Point of View, p.13).
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wo think those terms are not proper names? Secondly, if we do incline
to the view that such terms are not proper names, then which of the
multifarious ways in which they differ from proper names is the more
?central to the true principle of differentiation.
Tlie case of demonstratives is of less importance for these two 
questions. For it would seem that a straightforward condition of 
differentiation is given by the fact that for any determinacy of 
sentence meaning, imbedded demonstratives must require something like 
the specification of a relevant sortal. And a relevant sortal cannot 
be treated as a part of the meaning of "this" as we found to be the 
case with names. It was necessary^to know the meaning of a name,that 
one Imow the relevant covering concept for identity questions concern­
ing the bearer of the name. However, in the case of demonstratives 
a hearer cannot gather which individual is indicated by the speaker 
without seme explicit or implicit specification which answers the 
question "this what?".
In the case of names of universals or names of species, there 
appears to be a range of apparently linguistic differences between the 
behaviour of such expressions and the behaviour of proper names. To 
consider the logical content of these differences is clearly a topic 
in itself. For our purposes it is enou^ ÿi to see to what extent some 
of the possible distinctions may undermine our faith in the centrality
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of condition 2 to a general account of proper names.
At least two obvious differences in the behaviour of names of 
universals and species frcm the behaviour of proper names appear.
Ihe first is the asymmetry in their behaviour in negative existential 
contexts. An analysis of the statement "wisdom does not exist" can be 
given in terms of whether a certain concept is instantiated, whereas 
as we have seen for the standard case of proper names, "Mary does not 
exist" cannot be analysed as "there is no instance of Mary".^ Secondly, 
we might draw upon a further argument of Strawson’s to provide a second 
and important distinction between these expressions. Strawson argues 
that for identifying reference to particulars, a speaker must know 
some true empirical proposition to the effect that just one individual 
answers to a certain description. Itfhereas in the case of the introduc­
tion of universals into discourse there appear to be no such parallel 
conditions. The proposition "something is gT" is no more a sufficient 
condition than the proposition "nothing is to the introduction of 
the term'V-ness". Hence introduction of universals rests upon a 
tautology, whereas as we have seen, introduction of proper names into
1 A similar argument has been put by Strawson in Individuals, and also 
in "singular Terms and Predication", Journal of Philosophy I96I.
The asymmetry noted is not undermined by the possibility of names 
which are shared names. See for example J# Woodger, Biology and 
Language (Cambridge: 1952). For Woodger still uses the classifica­
tion of genuine proper names, for which this asymmetry still holds. 
Nevertheless the possibility of shared names does at least underline 
the difficulty in deciding whether names of universals are proper 
names.
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significant discourse does not. An important consequence of this 
asymmetry is that proper names are undermined in a serious way if 
the bearer of the name does not exist, whereas this does not apply 
to a name for a universal. "Dragonhood is 0' is true or false, 
irrespective of whether we find any dragons, whereas "Pegasus is 0 -^ 
lacks meaning and truth value.
These features of the behaviour of universal terms suggest the 
possibility of differentiation of such expressions from proper names, 
but they also raise the question whether the linguistic approach on 
the basis of condition 2 is not misguided. Both forms of asymmetry 
not only undermine our faith in condition 2 as a general principle of 
differentiation but also in the linguistic approach itself. They 
suggest the possibility of a more fundamental distinction between 
those terms grounded on a consideration of what can be named, rather 
than upon the question how do naming expressions behave. The need 
for such a different approach becomes all the stronger in the light 
of the weakness of the account which differentiated proper names from 
egocentric terms, such as '’'’here" and "now". For here already it looked 
as though the real issue as to whether such expressions are names asks 
to be fournit out on the level of what is named, rather than upon the 
linguistic features that these terras eadhibit. Do these expressions 
name definite places and times? Should we not look for some more
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fundamental condition of what it is to a proper name which is 
expressible in terms of the sorts of objects names pick out, and 
which will explain why condition 2 is effective insofar as it has 
appeared to be?
Now there have been many theories which attempt a general account 
of names from such a standpoint. Basically such theories begin from 
the premise that proper names are distinct from other designators in 
that they pick out determinate singular objects. Now clearly if this 
approach is to be successful it is necessary to give some coherent 
account of what it is to be a singular determinate object, or, what is 
more difficult, given the dummy nature of the term "object", what is 
it not to be singular and determinate?
Classically it has been argued that the force of "singular" is 
that a proper name names only one thing. But this explanation is 
either uninformative or false.^ Given Frege's account of one, it 
would seem that anything which instantiates any predicate can, on this 
criterion, be a proper nameable. Surely the Alps are as much a singu­
lar instantiation of the concept, mountain range, as Aristotle is a 
single instantiation of the concept, man. To make more of this
^ Cf. R. Wollheim. "Thought and Passion", Proceedings of the Aristot­
elian Society, 1967-68, where he argued that considerations of 
uniqueness are either otiose or out of place as a criterion for 
definite referring expressions.
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condition it seems we must import some restriction on what concepts 
proper nameables may instantiate. But clearly whatever sort of 
explanation we give here we will want to include the concept man, 
but it does not seem true to say that all proper names which name men, 
name just one man. For there seems no obvious reason why this should 
be, and furthermore there seem to be, on at least the capital letter 
criterion of proper names, some'counterexamples. "The Dioscouri" 
seems to qualify as a name, and yet it undoubtedly names two men.
Castor and Pollux.
Similar problems arise if we are to fill out the notion of 
"determinate". It is difficult to see what this notion can import for 
proper nameables beyond that they be something, or, that they instanti­
ate some concept. And what is it to be something which is not deter­
minate in this sense?
It,is arguable that what is really intended by these theorists, 
who attempt to import the notion of singular and determinate objects 
to help delimit a class of proper nameables, is that what can be named 
must be the sort of object which is or could be in space and time. On 
the basis of standard cases of proper names such a thesis has at least 
intuitive appeal. But the difficulty is how to justify such a condi­
tion. It might be thought that a synthesis of the linguistic and
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ontological approaches could be achieved by justifying this onto­
logical view by appeal to the linguistic condition 2, for surely 
condition 2 could not hold of a name for any object which was not a 
material object, or a dependent of one, i.e. not in space and time.
A name for an object which is not in space and time must be introduced 
via a definite description. Now in the case of names of material 
objects introduced first via definite descriptions we found that to 
deny the application of this description to the bearer was to talk 
nonsense in the case where that description is the only description 
available. We should no longer be in a position to know the meaning 
of the name. But in the case of names for objects which are not in 
space and time the situation is different. To deny the application of 
the original introducing description to the bearer of the name here 
does give us a contradiction. To put the point another way, any later 
descriptions which we might add to the set of true descriptions of 
the bearer of the name will be logically derivable from the set. Con­
sequently a name of an object which is not in space and time will 
contravene condition 2,
But this conclusion is scarcely surprising, and in as much as it 
fails to surprise it fails to be helpful. For we have already argued 
that number expressions cannot be names since they will fail condition 
2 in that there is some description which is substitutable for the
I4l
"name" in appropriate contexts. But in attempting to justify the 
view that names name spatio-temporal objects via condition 2 we have 
achieved no more than a reiteration of this conclusion. We have not 
found any independent condition which could explain the apparent 
coincidence of the ontological approach with the linguistic approach, 
or justify condition 2 itself.
It seems then that although condition 2 may pick up some essen­
tial feature of names, it cannot be generalised to provide a necessary 
and sufficient condition of what it is to be a proper name. If condi­
tion 2 gives only one sufficient condition of an expression’s being a 
name, then it is possible that on specification of other sufficient 
conditions, condition 2 Itself might be superseded. The question remains 
open as to whether there is not some more fundamental condition which 
could take up the slack left by condition 2, and account for its limited 
success. Until such a condition can be given it does not seem possible 
to specify less trivially than we have so far done what incorrectness 
can occur in names.
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3* Conclusion
The account given of tho role of names cannot be generalised 
to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of what it is to be 
a name. But this disappointment does not put in doubt the basic
approach to an explanation of the role of names. Although we may
not be in a position to set the limits to what terms are proper
names, we are now in a better position to explain how those expres­
sions in language which are proper names come to play a significant role
A name’s contribution to the truth conditions of a statement rests on
its function of picking out some individual. To Imow what contribution 
the name makes, or to know the meaning of a name, is to Imaw which
object the name names. The conditions which must be satisfied for a
speaker to know which individual the name names are that he should have 
at his disposal some definite individuating descriptions of that indi­
vidual which presupposes that he should know what sort of object it is 
that is named. Insofar as names have this function, they play a sig­
nificant role, or may be said to have meaning. However the meaning 
of a name is no longer something which we need to find in the world in 
order to explain the role of a name. There is no direct ansi'Jer to the 
question What is the meaning of a name, as there should have been had 
either the sense views or the designatory approach to the meaning of 
names succeeded* The virtue of our account is that neither a descrip­
tion of the bearer nor the bearer itself must be substitutable for the
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name, if the name is to be said to have meaning.
No»; this account which has been given of names does imply some 
stand upon the ontological disputes which divided those who disagreed 
over the function of names. The account which has followed from the 
dictum lands us neither with sense view theorists nor in the camp of 
those who supported a designatory view. However some of the advant­
ages claimed by each faction may be appropriated in support of our 
approach.
Despite the fact that it seems that no consistent account of the 
sense view can be given, it is still open to us to employ Bussell’s 
theory of definite descriptions, supplemented by Quine’s device of 
pseudo predicates, if we want a simple path to the quantification of 
negative existentiels. But now it is possible to give sane explana­
tion of Opine’s unanalysable irreducible predicate "Pegasises". We 
have then no reason to retract from a Quinean formulation of onto­
logical questions, in terms of the values of our variables. But the 
account of names does suggest at least an exception to the general 
scheme for meaning explanations given by sense and reference. To 
suggest that a name both has a reference and a sense, would seem on 
this account to overspecify the role of the name. With the loss of 
this general scheme we dispense with the proposed Sense and Reference 
explanation of a supposed difference in truth value between the
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statements "Hesperus is Phosphorus" and "Hesperus is Hesperus". But 
it is doubtful how great a loss is Involved. On the view proposed 
here we cannot explain any difference in modality of these statements. 
But given the opacity of indirect speech it is questionable if this 
matters.1
The ontological position of the pure designatory thesis seems 
harder to reconcile with the proposed account of names. Proper names 
clearly do not name the simple indestructible elements of the world. 
Socrates' statement in the Theacbetus, that "whatever is named in its 
own right has to be ... named without any other determination" can 
certainly not be applied to the bearers of proper names, for althou^ 
it may be possible for a speaker to use a name without knowing any 
true description of what is named, the things which are named cannot 
be known, or talked about independently of the properties they may 
instantiate. The argument from the premise of the peculiar and 
ineliminable function of names to the ontological priority of the 
bearers of names, cannot, it seems, ground a Lockean doctrine of sub­
stance, or even provide support for the priority of material objects 
to our scheme of things. But the account given does reflect on the 
very reason for which many philosophers were predisposed towards simple 
names and,their counterparts. The desire to eliminate the possibility
^ See P. Geach in Three Philosophers (Oxford: I96I) p.162.
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of truth gaps via names, guaranteed of bearers, cannot be and is not 
satisfied by the case of everyday lan,guage proper names. Naming, we 
have seen, is Intentional in the respect that a name which has no 
bearer can occur in language. Nevertheless, the occurence of truth 
gaps on the account given does acquire a different comnle-'d.on. 
Subject-predicate sentences in which a proper name occurs only fail 
of a truth value where they lack a meaning. There are then for sig­
nificant statements (made by such sentences) no truth value gaps.
To this extent Wittgenstein's design for names in the Tractatus can 
be justified. But at the same time, if we have lost some remnants of 
the problem of non-being for the bearers of proper names, we have also 
lost the relevance that the bearers of names might have had to matters 
of ontology.
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